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COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT IN
DECARBONIZATION: NEPA’S ROLE
Wyatt G. Sassman*
Abstract: This Article addresses a potential tension between two ambitions for the
transition to clean energy: reducing regulatory red-tape to quickly build out renewable energy,
and leveraging that build-out to empower low-income communities and communities of color.
Each ambition carries a different view of communities’ role in decarbonization. To those
focused on rapid build-out of renewable energy infrastructure, communities are a potential
threat who could slow or derail renewable energy projects through opposition during the
regulatory process. To those focused on leveraging the transition to clean energy to advance
racial and economic justice, communities are necessary partners in the key decisions of the
transition—including the development of renewable energy projects. The Biden
Administration has committed to both ambitions, but there is a gap regarding what role
communities will play in policies designed to implement decarbonization.
This Article articulates this “participatory gap” in decarbonization policy and proposes
changes to the regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) that start bridging these ambitions. The Article offers proposals that would leverage
NEPA’s unique structure to empower communities in decarbonization. Specifically, it argues
that NEPA’s regulations should be reformed to require meaningful community engagement
and enforce that commitment through a revitalized executive enforcement structure. Contrary
to views that more community engagement will slow decarbonization, this Article argues that
these reforms would support the rapid transition to renewable energy while also empowering
communities and elevating justice as a central value in environmental policy.
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INTRODUCTION
In the bright green grass of Archer, Florida, rows of black and white
yard signs read “NO to GRU Solar!”1 Archer, a rural town near
Gainesville, has come together to oppose a large renewable energy
development called the Sand Bluff project.2 Proposed by Origis Energy in
July 2020, the Sand Bluff project will erect solar panels over 600 acres of
agricultural land near Archer.3 The project will sell electricity to the
Gainesville Regional Utilities, where it will advance Gainesville’s
commitment to 100% renewable energy.4 Archer’s residents argue that
the huge project will change their community’s residential character and
could cause environmental damage.5 Moreover, they say that they will not
1. Camille Syed, Activist Groups Speak out Against Archer Solar Array Project, Alachua County
Plan Board Approves, WCJB (Apr. 26, 2021, 3:32 PM) (emphasis in original),
https://www.wcjb.com/2021/04/26/activist-groups-speak-out-against-archer-solar-array-projectalachua-county-plan-board-approves/ [https://perma.cc/4WLC-CM27].
2. See generally Kristi E. Swartz, Fla. Solar Plans Stoke Fight over ‘Environmental Racism’, E&E
NEWS (June 3, 2021, 6:08 AM), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1063733977
[https://perma.cc/ER6C-W2EC] (giving an overview of Archer’s opposition to the project).
3. Id.; see also Press Release, Origis Energy, First Gainesville, Fla., Large-Scale Solar and Storage
Project Announced by Gainesville Regional Utilities and Origis Energy (July 17, 2020),
https://origisenergy.com/first-gainesville-fla-large-scale-solar-and-storage-project-announced-bygainesville-regional-utilities-and-origis-energy/ [https://perma.cc/JP6H-YEF7].
4. See Swartz, supra note 2 (describing Gainesville’s “100% renewable energy goal”); see also
Andrew Caplan, City Commits to 100 Percent Renewable Energy, GAINESVILLE SUN (Oct. 18, 2018,
7:07 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/news/20181018/city-commits-to-100-percent-renewableenergy [https://perma.cc/43JB-LSW7] (noting that in 2018 the Gainesville City Commission
“unanimously passed a resolution committing to providing 100 percent of its energy entirely from
renewable resources by 2045”).
5. Emily Mavrakis, Alachua County Plan Board Approves Sand Bluff Solar Project Near Archer,
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even benefit from the project—all of the electricity gets sent to
Gainesville, not to their local utility, which is still heavily reliant on fossil
fuels.6
These arguments resonate with those made by local communities
across the United States opposing large renewable energy developments
needed to avoid the most catastrophic impacts of climate change.7 Such
opposition has prompted criticism from environmentalists and other
advocates who cast these communities as short-sighted and selfish
“NIMBYs”—a derogatory phrase familiar in land use and environmental
disputes that stands for “not in my backyard.”8
But Archer’s history as an African American community sets it apart.9
Archer includes “some of the nation’s earliest Black landowners.”10 Some
residents can “trace their lineage back six generations.”11 “Sharecroppers
and slaves bought this property and it’s been in their families for over 100

GAINESVILLE SUN (Apr. 22, 2021, 2:24 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/story/business/energyresource/2021/04/22/alachua-county-plan-board-oks-sand-bluff-solar-array-near-archer/
7283751002/ [https://perma.cc/YP3Y-CTFF] (noting concerns that the land “would be better used for
residential development, in keeping with its surroundings” and quoting residents who believe the
project will negatively affect their familial homes); see also id. (“Residents also said they’re
concerned about the environmental impact — protected gopher tortoises have been found on the site,
and they worry about potential water contamination if panels are damaged in a storm and chemicals
leak into wells.”).
6. See Swartz, supra note 2 (“Among the arguments from Archer residents is that they would not
get the solar electricity from either project. Archer is powered by the Clay Electric Cooperative, which
gets its electricity from the larger Seminole Electric Cooperative Inc., based in Tampa. Seminole
relies heavily on fossil fuels, including coal.”).
7. See id. (“People who live in rural areas often do not want their land to be disturbed by what they
consider to be industrial infrastructure. Some simply do not want to look at the shiny panels or are
worried about property values.”); see also infra section I.B (discussing local opposition to renewable
energy projects).
8. See infra section I.B (discussing “NIMBYism”). Indeed, six out of nine board members of the
local Sierra Club chapter resigned in protest after the environmental group issued a letter in support
of Archer’s opposition to the Sand Bluff project. The Gainesville Sun Editorial Board, Solar Power
Should
Be
Encouraged,
GAINESVILLE
SUN
(Nov.
30,
2020,
7:48
AM),
https://www.gainesville.com/story/opinion/2020/11/29/editorial-solar-power-should-encouraged/
6406877002/ [https://perma.cc/93RQ-S37T]. One board member described the Sierra Club’s
opposition to any solar project, whenever it is located, as “indefensible” in the face of climate change.
Id. (“After a Sierra Club Florida official asked the County Commission not to move forward with the
project, the local Suwannee-St. Johns chapter of the Sierra Club had six of its nine executive
committee members resign. ‘The idea that the Sierra Club would come out against solar is
indefensible,’ Scott Camil, one of the former committee members, said in an email to The Sun.
‘Anything that we can do to limit fossil fuels and switch to renewables helps the whole planet.’”).
9. See Swartz, supra note 2 (noting that “in Archer, which is in Alachua County just outside
Gainesville, the concerns run deeper” than other communities opposing renewable energy
developments).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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years,” the president of the local NAACP chapter explained.12 “[T]he land
has history.”13 By asking the community to shoulder burdens for others’
benefit, Sand Bluff represents not a new threat but another example in a
history of exploitation. “History keeps repeating itself,” a commenter
noted, “when it comes to energy companies using these rural Black
communities specifically as a dumping ground for their solar farms.”14
Residents’ opposition to the project is rooted in “Archer’s history” and a
demand for “respect” as much as it is about the placement of the solar
panels.15 Archer’s residents had little to no say in the plans to locate the
project in their community, both because of the limited role for
communities in the current planning and development processes for
renewable energy projects and because the developer plans to locate the
project just outside of Archer’s city limits.16 It’s for this reason that, just
below “NO to GRU Solar,” the signs read “Black Communities Matter”
and “Dumping GRU Solar in Archer is Inequitable and Racist.”17 The
local county commission ultimately voted to not allow the project, with
several commissioner’s citing concerns that the developer had not
sufficiently involved nearby communities.18 Origis, for its part, did not
abandon the project but instead has asked regulators for more time to talk
with Archer’s African American community.19
Archer’s opposition to the Sand Bluff project highlights a looming
12. Syed, supra note 1 (“The Alachua County NAACP President, Evelyn Foxx, said the facility
will negatively impact the African-American community. . . . Foxx agrees the development is not fair
to neighbors, as the land has history.”).
13. Id.
14. Valeriya Antonshchuk, Black Communities Concerned About Pending Alachua County
Commission Decision on New Archer Solar Farm, WUFT (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://www.wuft.org/news/2021/03/01/communities-remain-concerned-about-alachua-countycommissioners-decision-on-new-archer-solar-farm/ [https://perma.cc/JQ2P-2X74].
15. Swartz, supra note 2.
16. See id.; see also Emily Mavrakis, ‘You Picked the Wrong Neighborhood’: County Denies Sand
Bluff Solar Project Outside Archer, GAINESVILLE SUN (July 8, 2021, 10:58 AM),
https://www.gainesville.com/story/news/local/2021/07/07/commissioners-deny-sand-bluff-solarproject-application-outside-archer/7868226002/ [https://perma.cc/9E4S-UP2F] (noting that the
project is proposed “just outside Archer city limits”).
17. Syed, supra note 1 (emphasis in original).
18. Mavrakis, supra note 16 (“One of the reasons Commissioners Marihelen Wheeler, Anna Prizzia
and Chuck Chestnut voted against the project is because, after hearing testimony from many
neighborhood residents, they felt that not enough community outreach had been done to fully inform
them about the project.”).
19. John Henderson, Origis to Delay Challenge of Rejected Solar Project Plan to Talk with
Protesters, GAINESVILLE SUN (Aug. 17, 2021, 10:12 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/story/news/
2021/08/17/origis-appeal-alachau-countys-rejected-sand-bluff-solar-project-archer-delayed/
8153796002/ [https://perma.cc/KXW8-UURV] (noting delay and that “Origis Energy says it first
wants time to talk with residents of an historic African-American community who live near the site
and have voiced opposition to the proposed Sand Bluff project”).
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conflict between two ambitions of the United States’ transition to clean
energy. The first ambition is a rapid and massive deployment of renewable
energy infrastructure. Meeting the United States’ carbon emissions
reduction targets will require building huge amounts of wind and solar
power at rates and scales never before seen in the country.20 To achieve
this, legal scholars and policy advocates have proposed reforming much
of the environmental permitting and regulatory schemes that have
historically slowed both public and private renewable energy
developments in the United States.21 From this perspective, communities
that oppose renewable energy developments are a threat to
decarbonization, and the tools they use to slow renewable energy projects
should be tightly constrained—if not dismantled altogether.22
The second ambition is to leverage decarbonization to advance racial,
economic, and environmental justice.23 The transition to clean energy will
be a transformative, generation-defining infrastructure project
comparable in ambition and social impact to the New Deal.24 By remaking
a fundamental aspect of American life—the generation and moving of
electricity—the transition offers an opportunity to also remake structures
of power and inequality tied to that system.25 To achieve this ambition,
legal scholars and policy advocates argue for elevating the voices of
communities of color and low-income communities—communities that
have borne the heaviest burdens of our fossil fuel energy system—in the
central decisions of decarbonization, including where and how renewable
energy projects are developed.26 From this perspective, communities
should lead the transition to clean energy, and legal reforms should
empower communities in this process.27
Between these two ambitions is an open question: what role will
communities play in the transition to clean energy? The question has
important implications for the wide range of legal reforms planned to
enable rapid decarbonization.28 Some areas targeted for reform, such as
20. See infra section I.A (describing decarbonization’s renewable energy goals).
21. See id. (discussing the scale of renewable energy deployment need to meet goals).
22. See infra section I.B (discussing NIMBYism and local opposition to renewables).
23. See infra notes 77–87, 177–187 and accompanying text.
24. Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 307, 323–24 (2019); see also infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 177–188 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text.
28. See generally LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach eds., 2018)
(detailing expansive reforms across energy law, environmental law, and other legal fields to enable
decarbonization).
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environmental law, have long traditions of public participation and
oversight.29 Other areas, such as energy law, are building in new tools for
public participation.30 While the challenge of decarbonization has
provided a unifying goal for reforms in these areas, the lack of a coherent
vision for communities’ role in decarbonization has created important
gaps as well, particularly regarding how to approach these public
participation requirements.31 Upcoming changes to the regulations
implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)32
will be one of the first opportunities to confront this question and start
filling these gaps.
NEPA is the United States’ first modern environmental law—the
Magna Carta of environmental protection.33 Initially intended to mandate
sustainable decision-making across the federal government, NEPA is now
primarily known for its procedural requirement that agencies study and
disclose the environmental impacts of their decisions.34 Over time, this
procedural requirement overshadowed all other aspects of the statute.35
The assessment process has become increasingly complex, with some
federal agencies taking years to complete the necessary documents.36 The

29. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Environmental Laws of the 1970s: They Looked Good
on Paper, 12 VT. J. ENV’T L. 1, 26 (2010) (describing public participation as one of the values
enshrined by early environmental statutes and “a shining beacon of environmental law”).
30. See Press Release, Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, FERC Establishes Office of Public
Participation (June 24, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/ferc-establishes-office-publicparticipation [https://perma.cc/94UK-3QJB] (describing FERC’s recent efforts to comply with a
statutory mandate over forty years old to incorporate a participatory feature into its energy regulatory
process).
31. See infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
32. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347).
33. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, ARIANNE M. AUGHEY, DONALD
MCGILLIVRAY & MEINHARD DOELLE, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:1 (2d ed. 2021) (describing
NEPA as “an environmental Magna Carta”); Oliver A. Houck, Is That All? A Review of The National
Environmental Policy Act, an Agenda for the Future, by Lynton Keith Caldwell, 11 DUKE ENV’T L.
& POL’Y F. 173, 173 (2000) (book review) (describing NEPA’s international influence).
34. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) (“NEPA imposes only
procedural requirements to ‘ensur[e] that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and
will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.’”
(quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989))).
35. See Sam Kalen, Ecology Comes of Age: NEPA’s Lost Mandate, 21 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F.
113, 115, 118–19 (2010) [hereinafter Kalen, Lost Mandate] (discussing NEPA’s purpose, history, and
reduction to a procedural requirement); Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The
Withering Away of the National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND, RES., &
ENV’T L. 245, 249 (2000) (same); Paul S. Weiland, Amending the National Environmental Policy
Act: Federal Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 12 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 275,
281–82 (1997) (same); see also infra Part II.
36. See John C. Ruple & Kayla M. Race, Measuring the NEPA Litigation Burden: A Review of
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public also plays an important role, with affected communities submitting
comments during the NEPA process and seeking judicial review if the
agency fails to complete the process correctly.37 NEPA’s lengthy
assessment requirements and public oversight provisions have been
criticized for delaying or derailing important infrastructure projects by
stalling and slowing federal decision-making.38 NEPA even has a specific
reputation as a tool for “NIMBY” opposition to projects.39
NEPA has long been a target for reform because of this idiosyncratic
development. NEPA settled into its character as a purely procedural
statute through a complex interplay of politics, early judicial decisions,
and federal regulations.40 Over time, this shift in focus to NEPA’s
procedures changed perceptions of NEPA’s purposes, which are now
frequently articulated as generating environmental information and
providing opportunities for public participation.41 These modern purposes
bear little to no relationship to NEPA’s statutory structure or
congressional intent.42 As a result, many early reform proposals sought to
return NEPA to its original statutory purposes.43 Other proposals sought
to better conform NEPA to its new purposes, such as using its process to
modernize federal environmental decision-making or advance
environmental justice through stronger and more meaningful public

1,499 Federal Court Cases, 50 ENV’T L. 479, 496 (2020) (noting that agencies can take “a median of
3.6 years and an average (mean) of 4.5 years” from the start of the NEPA process to its conclusion
with the most complex projects).
37. See Ruple & Race, supra note 36, at 484, 487 (discussing the role of public comments and
judicial review of final agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act).
38. See, e.g., John Ruple & Heather Tanana, Debunking the Myths Behind the NEPA Review
Process, 35 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 14, 14 (2020) (“Conventional wisdom is that NEPA compliance is
unduly burdensome; NEPA litigation is an overused cudgel for environmentalists; and NEPA
unreasonably delays much-needed projects, thereby hurting the economy.”); Lindstrom, supra note
35, at 264 (arguing that “NEPA could also use revitalization and sharper ‘teeth’ compelling ecological
justifications”).
39. See Denis Binder, NEPA at 50: Standing Tall, 23 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 45 (2020) (“NEPA has
become a tool of the NIMBY movement.”).
40. See infra Part II (discussing the NEPA’s development).
41. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004) (“The NEPA EIS
requirement serves two purposes. First, ‘[i]t ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will
have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental
impacts.’ Second, it ‘guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the larger
audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that
decision.’” (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989))).
42. See infra notes 126–138 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Kalen, Lost Mandate, supra note 35, at 115 (noting Lynton Caldwell, one of the chief
framers of NEPA, warned that NEPA’s purpose was being threatened by overemphasis on its
procedures and proposing reforms).
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participation.44 Many simply sought to get NEPA out of the way, arguing
that its assessment process should be cut back and streamlined.45 But these
reform projects had limited success; some resulted in incremental changes
or improvements, but the basic structure of NEPA’s process and purposes
has generally remained the same since the late 1970s.46
Then, as with many areas of American life, 2020 changed everything
for NEPA’s regulatory landscape. The Trump Administration
promulgated wide-ranging reforms to NEPA’s implementing
regulations.47 These reforms were intended to streamline NEPA’s process
by narrowing its application, limiting the public’s role, and confining
judicial review.48 The looming threat of climate change created divisions
within the environmental community over these reforms. While the
broader environmental community criticized them, some renewableenergy advocates praised them for easing the way for renewable energy
development.49 Advocates of a rapid transition away from fossil fuels
therefore struck a middle ground: supporting some reconsideration of the
Trump rules but arguing against a return to the status quo that had defined
the NEPA process since the 1970s.50 Environmental justice and
community advocates also argued that a return to the status quo is not
44. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, at iii
(1997), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-publications/nepa25fn.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF44-FN6N]
(discussing NEPA’s potential as a tool for adaptive management); Uma Outka, NEPA and
Environmental Justice: Integration, Implementation, and Judicial Review, 33 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L.
REV. 601, 601 (2006) [hereinafter Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice] (reviewing NEPA’s
history with environmental justice); see also infra section III.B.
45. See Ruple & Tanana, supra note 38, at 14.
46. See Houck, supra note 33, at 184.
47. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508,
1515–1518) (final rule amending NEPA’s implementing regulations).
48. Id.
49. See Devin Hartman, Stimulating Clean Infrastructure Through NEPA Reform, REAL CLEAR
ENERGY (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2020/04/22/stimulating_clean_in
frastructure_through_nepa_reform_489766.html [https://perma.cc/X736-H8RB] (“[T]he clean
energy industry generally views the direction of the Trump Administration’s proposal as on-point.
Those involved with solar project permitting call the Administration’s proposed changes ‘welcome
and necessary.’ The American Wind Energy Association went so far to say that modernizing the
process ‘would both strengthen our economy and enhance environmental stewardship.’”).
50. See CHRISTY GOLDFUSS, TIM PROFETA, KRISTINA COSTA & JEREMY SYMONS, EXEC. OFF. OF
THE PRESIDENT, CLIMATE 21 PROJECT TRANSITION MEMO 12 [hereinafter CLIMATE 21 TRANSITION
MEMO], https://climate21.org/documents/C21_EOP.pdf [https://perma.cc/66SY-A8FU] (“Merely
restoring NEPA to its traditional form will not enable the federal government to effectively permit
the clean energy infrastructure—including generation, transmission, and sequestration
infrastructure—needed to meet an ambitious goal like achieving 100 percent clean electricity by
2035.”).
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feasible, but for different reasons.51 These advocates and organizers
criticize limitations in the public participation and oversight provisions
that have been part of NEPA’s process since the 1970s, and emphasize
importance of strengthening and deepening communities’ role in the
NEPA process as part of any reforms.52 So while the Biden
Administration entered office with a commitment to reconsider the Trump
Administration’s reforms and advance an ambitious climate agenda,
advocates staked out competing visions of communities’ role in a
reformed NEPA process.53 Both acknowledge that communities should
play some role in the transition, but there is no clarity on what that should
look like.54
Upcoming reform of NEPA’s implementing regulations therefore
offers an early and important opportunity to start addressing the
participatory gap in decarbonization policy. This Article offers three
contributions targeted at doing so. First, it describes the nature of this
participatory gap in decarbonization policy. The Article argues that this
gap is rooted in a NIMBYism narrative that skews legal scholarship and
policy advocacy around reforms intended to advance decarbonization.
Naming and explaining this gap is the first key contribution of the Article,
and this explanation informs the Article’s approach to NEPA. Empirical
research on community engagement in renewable energy development
discredits this NIMBYism narrative and suggests that deeper, more
meaningful public engagement in renewable energy developments is
aligned with the goals of rapid decarbonization. This alignment provides
a path for NEPA reform that both supports community empowerment and
rapid decarbonization.
The Article’s second contribution is a structural perspective on

51. See Kelsey Brugger, Biden CEQ Pick Signals NEPA Changes, E&E NEWS (Dec. 21, 2020, 1:30
PM), https://www.eenews.net/articles/biden-ceq-pick-signals-nepa-changes/ [https://perma.cc/5N427YRE] (quoting several environmental justice advocates on the need to improve NEPA’s procedures
to better engage communities).
52. See id. As environmental justice advocate Peggy Shepard put it, “[t]here shouldn’t be public
comment—there should be public engagement” under an improved NEPA. Id.
53. See Heather Richards & Kelsey Brugger, How Biden’s NEPA Plan Hits Energy, E&E NEWS
(Feb. 19, 2021, 7:29 AM) (noting that the Biden Administration’s early actions signal its “intentions
to put NEPA in the center of its climate framework”); see also CLIMATE 21 TRANSITION MEMO, supra
note 50, at 12 (arguing for a “Day One” priority “to evolve NEPA into a creative, flexible,
environmentally sustainable, and efficient tool for infrastructure design, siting, and permitting”).
54. For example, a recent report on how to achieve Biden’s decarbonization goals argued that a
“balance” must be “struck between the imperative to expedite environmental review for renewable
energy projects and adequate community engagement” without elaborating. LEAH C. STOKES, SAM
RICKETTS, OLIVIA QUINN, NARAYAN SUBRAMANIAN & BRACKEN HENDRICKS, A ROADMAP TO
100% CLEAN ELECTRICITY BY 2035, at 48 (2021) [hereinafter EVERGREEN ROADMAP],
https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/evergreen-ces-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GYJ-GFR5].
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reforming NEPA to empower communities. Despite an overall record of
failures, NEPA’s statutory structure makes it well suited to advance
community empowerment and environmental justice across the federal
government. Reviving an overlooked aspect of NEPA’s statutory
structure—its executive-enforcement scheme—and harmonizing that
enforcement structure with NEPA’s modern role as a tool for public
participation can tap into this structural potential. This perspective
advances the literature on NEPA reform by linking NEPA’s executiveenforcement structure with the literature on NEPA and environmental
justice.
Third, the Article proposes regulatory reforms. Because of its
idiosyncratic development, structural change to NEPA’s process and role
can be achieved by reforming its implementing regulations. The Article
therefore proposes regulatory reforms to better fit NEPA’s participatory
function with the statute’s underutilized executive-oversight structure. By
leveraging NEPA to elevate community empowerment as a central value
within federal environmental policy, the reforms would help pursue the
dual ambitions of rapid decarbonization and advancing racial, economic,
and environmental justice.
The Article makes these contributions in three parts. Part I identifies
the participatory gap in decarbonization policy, highlighting the influence
that local opposition to renewable energy development and NIMBYism
has played in debates regarding NEPA reforms. Part II briefly offers some
history on NEPA’s intended structure of executive oversight, with an
emphasis on that structure’s failure and the rise of public participation and
judicial oversight as the primary methods of ensuring NEPA compliance.
Part II then discusses NEPA’s potential as a tool for community
empowerment and the statute’s history with environmental justice, laying
the groundwork for my proposed reforms. Part III offers proposals to
mandate meaningful community engagement and revive executive
oversight. Part III first lays out the regulatory details of the proposals and
then articulates the benefits of the proposal along three lines: empowering
communities, supporting rapid decarbonization, and centering justice in
federal environmental policy.
I.

DECARBONIZATION’S PARTICIPATORY GAP

This section highlights the lack of any positive vision for public
participation in decarbonization, using NEPA reform as an example.
Section I.A articulates the stakes and scale of decarbonizing electricity
generation in the United States, emphasizing the transformative goal of
leveraging the transition away from fossil fuels to address racial and
economic inequality. Section I.B then turns to the participatory gap in
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NEPA reform, noting that communities’ participation in renewable
energy developments is a contested issue. Many reform proposals are
influenced by a view that local communities are a potential threat to rapid
development. The tension between the transformative goals of
decarbonization and view of local communities as a potential threat
reveals the need for a positive vision of community participation expressly
directed towards community empowerment.
A.

Decarbonization’s Transformative Potential

Climate change is an urgent and existential threat to life as we know it.
Without dramatic changes, the world will likely experience an increase in
overall global temperatures of three degrees Celsius or more—an outcome
that would result in catastrophic loss of life and disruption across the
world.55 After decades of inaction, our ability to avoid serious warming
and its expected harms is now limited; in other words, a substantial
amount of global warming is already “baked in,” although just how much
is widely debated.56 The international community has focused on limiting
warming to between one-and-a-half degrees and two degrees Celsius,
which they see as a feasible target that carries a wide range of harms but
a lower likelihood of catastrophe.57 Limiting warming to one-and-a-half
degrees will likely require, at a minimum, reducing global greenhouse gas
55. While predictions of likely warming are contested, there is some agreement that the current
path is, at least, headed towards catastrophe. See Zeke Hausfather & Glen P. Peters, Emissions—The
‘Business
as
Usual’
Story
Is
Misleading,
NATURE
(Jan.
29,
2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00177-3
[https://perma.cc/8GN8-TYEX]
(“Assessment of current policies suggests that the world is on course for around 3 °C of warming
above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century—still a catastrophic outcome, but a long way
from 5 °C.”).
56. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 66 (2019) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT ON WARMING OF 1.5°C],
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4L9U-B2FD] (“Expert judgement based on the available evidence (including model
simulations, radiative forcing and climate sensitivity) suggests that if all anthropogenic emissions
were reduced to zero immediately, any further warming beyond the 1°C already experienced would
likely be less than 0.5°C over the next two to three decades, and also likely less than 0.5°C on a century
time scale.” (emphasis in original)); see also Chen Zhou, Mark D. Zelinka, Andrew E. Dessler &
Minghuai Wang, Greater Committed Warming After Accounting for the Pattern Effect, 11 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 132 (2021) (finding that historic emissions will result in over 2°C degrees of
warming).
57. SPECIAL REPORT ON WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 56, at 5 (“Climate-related risks for natural
and human systems are higher for global warming of 1.5°C than at present, but lower than at 2°C
(high confidence).” (emphasis in original)); see also Paris Agreement to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104
(agreeing to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial
levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”).
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emissions by 45% by 2030 and achieving net-zero global greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050.58 Many nations have adopted some form of this
target.59 Under the Biden Administration, the United States has committed
to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050.60
Achieving these goals is a “herculean” task.61 The primary sources of
global greenhouse gas emissions are industrialized economies that are
heavily dependent on the extraction and burning of fossil fuels to generate
electricity, transport people and things, and support industry.62 For the
United States, both the timeline of the Biden Administration’s
commitment and the scale of this necessary shift away from fossil fuels
means fundamentally restructuring our economy on a timeline of roughly
ten to twenty years.
An initial priority for decarbonization is to shift electricity generation
away from fossil fuels towards zero-carbon sources. Decarbonizing
electricity generation is an important first step in meeting emissions
targets for two reasons. First, it reduces emissions from a major fossil fuel
dependent sector. And second, it opens the door to further shifts away
from fossil fuels through electrification of other high-emission sectors,
such as transportation.63 The Biden Administration’s plans reflect this
58. SPECIAL REPORT ON WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 56; see also J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets the Old Green Laws?, 44 VT. L. REV. 693, 702
(2020) (“To contain climate change to a 2°C warming scenario, recent studies strongly support the
necessity of reducing greenhouse gas emissions at least 50% by 2030, and to move to net zero, if not
net negative, by 2050.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 703–04 (discussing tipping points).
59. See Chapter XXVII Environment, 7.d Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION (Nov. 17, 2021, 7:15 AM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREA
TY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/59B4-6NXU] (listing the
signatories to the Paris Agreement).
60. See Fact Sheet: President Biden Takes Executive Actions to Tackle the Climate Crisis at Home
and Abroad, Create Jobs, and Restore Scientific Integrity Across Federal Government, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Jan. 27, 2021) [hereinafter Fact Sheet on Biden Climate Plan],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/27/fact-sheet-presidentbiden-takes-executive-actions-to-tackle-the-climate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad-create-jobs-andrestore-scientific-integrity-across-federal-government/ [https://perma.cc/4FH2-W8W2] (noting
commitment to “a carbon pollution-free power sector by 2035” and “a net-zero economy by 2050”).
61. See Jeff Tollefson, IPCC Says Limiting Global Warming to 1.5°C Will Require Drastic Action,
NATURE
(Oct.
8,
2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06876-2
[https://perma.cc/2Z4E-QW6A] (“Limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels
would be a herculean task, involving rapid, dramatic changes in how governments, industries and
societies function . . . .”).
62. See Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data [https://perma.cc/K697VTBA] (noting that a majority of emissions come from fossil-fuel sources and industrialized nations
such as the United States, China, and those in the EU).
63. See JAMES H. WILLIAMS, BENJAMIN HALEY & RYAN JONES, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 70–72 (2015), https://ddpinitiative.org/ddpp-unitedstates/ [https://perma.cc/7ZRG-R74H] (detailing principal steps in decarbonization).
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strategy, committing to decarbonizing electricity generation in the United
States by 2035 to support shifts in other high-emissions sectors, such as
transportation and residential heating.64
A recent report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine suggests that this transition is currently feasible but only
barely so, in part because of the massive infrastructure challenge
presented by decarbonizing electricity generation.65 Electricity in the
United States has historically been generated at large, centralized sources
(such as a fossil-fueled power plant) and distributed to people through a
complex, multi-jurisdictional system of transmission lines.66
Decarbonizing electricity generation presents several challenges to this
system. Replacing fossil fuels as a primary source of electricity will likely
require, among other steps, an unprecedented build-out of wind turbines
and solar panels at scales and rates never before seen in the United
States.67 Generating electricity from solar and wind typically requires
more geographic space than generating electricity from fossil-fueled
sources.68 And optimum geographic locations for wind and solar projects
64. See Fact Sheet on Biden Climate Plan, supra note 60 (noting goal of a “carbon pollution-free
power sector by 2035”); see also Michael Gerrard, How Biden Can Put the U.S. on a Path to CarbonFree Electricity, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 3, 2020), https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-biden-canlaunch-the-u-s-on-a-path-to-carbon-free-electricity [https://perma.cc/7EUR-YVLA] (noting that the
2050 goal “will eventually require all new passenger cars to be electric, all new buildings to have
electric heat and hot water, and many other economic activities to switch from oil, natural gas, or coal
to electricity”).
65. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., ACCELERATING DECARBONIZATION OF THE U.S.
ENERGY
SYSTEM
32
(2021)
[hereinafter
NATIONAL
ACADEMIES
REPORT],
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25932/accelerating-decarbonization-of-the-us-energy-system
[https://perma.cc/6CL9-VAV9] (click “Download Free PDF” hyperlink; then click “Download as
Guest” hyperlink; then enter email address; click the “Yes, I accept the terms of use” box; and click
the “Continue” hyperlink; then click the “Download PDF (Full Book)” hyperlink) (describing
decarbonization as “on the edge of feasibility”).
66. See Alexandra B. Klass, Expanding the U.S. Electric Transmission and Distribution Grid to
Meet Deep Decarbonization Goals, 47 ENV’T L. REP. 10749, 10749–51 (2017) (describing the grid).
67. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT, supra note 65, at 8 (“During the 2020s, the nation
would need to roughly double the share of electricity generated by non-carbon-emitting sources to
roughly 75 percent by 2030. Until 2025, this would require an average pace of wind and solar
installation that each year matches or exceeds the record historical yearly deployment of these
technologies and accelerates to an even faster pace from 2025 to 2030.”); Michael B. Gerrard, Legal
Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable Generation Capacity, 47 ENV’T L. REP.
10591, 10592 (2017) (noting the massive increase in renewable generation “required to replace most
fossil fuel generation and to help furnish the added electricity that will be needed as many uses
currently employing fossil fuels (especially passenger transportation and space and water heating) are
electrified”).
68. See SAMANTHA GROSS, BROOKINGS INST., RENEWABLES, LAND USE, AND LOCAL OPPOSITION
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
3,
8
(2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/FP_20200113_renewables_land_use_local_opposition_gross.pdf
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are not necessarily near existing energy infrastructure, such as
transmission lines.69 Solar and wind sources also generate power
intermittently when the sun is shining and wind is blowing, unlike fossilfueled power plants that burn non-stop or on demand, requiring updates
and other changes to our system of delivering electricity.70
Collectively, these complications mean that decarbonizing electricity
generation will likely require more land for wind turbines and solar
panels, more land for power lines, and replacing or updating other existing
infrastructure.71 This amounts to one of the most ambitious infrastructure
programs ever contemplated in the United States—reworking one of the
most legally, technologically, and socially complex systems in American
life on a short deadline.72
The stakes and scale of decarbonizing electricity generation have many
implications, two of which are important here. First, the Biden
Administration’s election and commitment to decarbonization has spurred
long-standing efforts to reform environmental law and enable massive,
rapid renewable energy development.73 Legal commenters have long
identified ways that environmental law institutionalizes the fossil fuel
energy system and erects barriers to renewable energy projects.74 This
counterintuitive effect can stem from competing mandates across
environmental laws that highlight the field’s outdated character in the

[https://perma.cc/79LF-AKG3] (“The power density of renewable power is one to two orders of
magnitude lower than that for fossil fuel power, meaning that renewable power requires at least ten
times more land area per unit of power produced,” although “a real zero-carbon power system will
not take up nearly as much land as its power density might suggest.”).
69. See id. at 9.
70. See id. at 3 (noting the intermittency of renewable power generation).
71. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 58, at 711–13 (summarizing potential land impacts of
transitioning to renewable energy); Klass, supra note 66, at 10753 (describing updates to the
transmission system for renewables).
72. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 58, at 712 (“This will be, to say the least, the most ambitious
infrastructure project in our nation’s history.”).
73. See, e.g., CLIMATE 21 TRANSITION MEMO, supra note 50, at 12 (identifying reforms to NEPA
to streamline renewable energy development as a “Day One” priority for the Biden Administration).
74. See Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1682 (2012) (arguing that “an implicit support structure for fossil energy is
written into law in a range of areas, including environmental law, and that statutory and regulatory
concessions to fossil energy inevitably distort how the costs of bringing new energy technologies,”
such as renewable energy, “to scale are perceived”); see also John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of
Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59, 88 (2013) (detailing, among other
things, challenges to renewable energy projects under environmental laws); cf. Amy J. Wildermuth,
Is Environmental Law a Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources?, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509,
537 (2010) (“Although environmental law does not pose a barrier, it also does not affirmatively
encourage the development of alternative energy.”).
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complex and uncertain era of climate change.75 As an early priority for
reducing carbon emissions, legal and policy commenters have called for
major reforms to environmental law to speed the transition to renewable
energy.76
Second, the immense stakes and scale of decarbonization emphasize its
transformative potential. In remaking one of the central building blocks
of modern American life, decarbonization also offers an opportunity to
transform systems of power and inequality in the United States.77 The
Green New Deal, for example, reflects this opportunity: a framework that
successfully elevated the transformative potential of decarbonization to
address issues of racial and economic inequality in American political
discourse.78 The Biden Administration has largely endorsed, albeit
without the name, this transformative approach.79
As Professor Shalanda Baker—now the Deputy Director of Energy
Justice at the U.S. Department of Energy—explained, harnessing this
transformative potential requires expressly elevating historically
disempowered communities to participate in the central decisions of the
transition.80 Like many systems of power in the United States, the
development and persistence of the fossil fuel energy system reflects and
replicates our national legacy of racial and economic inequality.81 Along
the entire lifecycle of fossil fuels—from extraction, to refining, to
combustion—pollution and other negative impacts of fossil fuel reliance

75. J.B. Ruhl has called these “green versus green” conflicts. J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial
Wind Power and the Endangered Species Act Through Administrative Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1769, 1773 (2012) [hereinafter Ruhl, Harmonizing Wind Power].
76. See generally LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 28 (detailing expansive reforms across energy law, environmental law, and other legal fields to
enable decarbonization).
77. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT, supra note 65, at 39 (“The transition to net zero
provides a unique opportunity to build an energy system that is fair to all Americans and to help
redress past discrimination and build a more just society.”).
78. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Wyatt G. Sassman & Danielle C. Jefferis, Beyond
Emissions: Migration, Prisons, and the Green New Deal, 51 ENV’T L. 161, 170–80 (2021) (discussing
the Green New Deal’s framework and foundations).
79. See Julian Brave NoiseCat, Joe Biden Has Endorsed the Green New Deal in All but Name,
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2020, 6:07 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/20/joebiden-has-endorsed-the-green-new-deal-in-all-but-name
[https://perma.cc/BJ35-3VTK]
(“On
Tuesday, Joe Biden did something unprecedented for a Democratic candidate assured of nomination:
he moved left.”); see also Marianne Lavelle, House Democrats’ Climate Plan Embraces Much of
Green New Deal, but Not a Ban on Fracking, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 1, 2020),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/30062020/house-democrats-climate-plan-green-new-deal-notban-fracking [https://perma.cc/7JEM-MBLL].
80. See Shalanda H. Baker, Anti-Resilience: A Roadmap for Transformational Justice Within the
Energy System, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 38–47 (2019).
81. Id. at 9–21.
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have disproportionately harmed communities of color and low-income
communities.82 This disproportionate harm, in turn, has disempowered
communities of color and low-income communities through economic
dependence and marginalized political power.83 Leveraging
decarbonization to address these legacies requires, among other things,
implementing the transition to renewable energy using expressly antiracist and anti-oppressive policies.84 These policies should elevate these
communities’ voices in decision-making and recognize that “historically
disadvantaged groups should get additional assistance, rather than ‘equal’
assistance” to “level a historically uneven playing field.”85 Baker warns
that approaches to the transition that emphasize “urgent action” and “at
any cost”—a view she calls “[c]limate [c]hange [f]undamentalism”—risk
crowding out necessary focus on community empowerment to achieve
decarbonization’s transformative potential.86 Failing to center lowincome communities and communities of color in the transition risks
repeating the exclusionary legacy of the early environmental movement
and leaving disempowered communities vulnerable to a new set of threats
from the transition.87
82. Id. at 10–15 (noting that “Black and brown bodies have always borne the burden of the United
States’ energy system” and discussing evidence); see also TIM DONAGHY & CHARLIE JIANG,
GREENPEACE, FOSSIL FUEL RACISM: HOW PHASING OUT OIL, GAS, AND COAL CAN PROTECT
COMMUNITIES 2 (2021), https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Fossil-FuelRacism.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9S3-VK3Y] (finding that “[b]urning fossil fuels” and “[o]il and gas
extraction” disproportionately harm “Black, Brown, Indigenous, and poor communities”).
83. Baker, supra note 80, at 9–21 (describing “an energy system that, as many have documented,
has systematically isolated people of color and low-income people in communities with compromised
air quality, dirty water, and little hope of economic empowerment” and the “extractive relationship”
between the fossil fuel industry and communities of color and low-income communities that “yields
the same benefits and results that traditional colonies afforded the colonizer: a colony stripped of
political power and voice; a privileged class within the colony that facilitates the work of the
colonizer; and an outside world willfully blind to the harm enacted on the colony because it benefits
from the goods and services extracted from the colony”).
84. Id. at 38–47.
85. Id. at 42–43.
86. Id. at 15–17; see also Eileen Gauna, Environmental Law, Civil Rights and Sustainability: Three
Frameworks for Environmental Justice, 19 J. ENV’T & SUSTAINABILITY L. 34, 56 (2012) [hereinafter
Gauna, Three Frameworks] (noting a “new inequity of imperative”); id. (“We take the imperative of
climate change, and the unquestionable need to do something fast, and use that to justify the siting of
carbon-friendly, but still troublesome facilities in those communities that historically have been at the
end of the path of least resistance.”).
87. Baker, supra note 80, at 16–18. Regarding the new threats from the clean energy transition, see
Welton & Eisen, supra note 24 for a survey of a wide range of justice issues raised by the transition
to clean energy; Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Equity, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 335, 354–76 discussing
the same; Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: Learning from Environmental Justice, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 789, 804–18 (2017) [hereinafter Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift],
discussing issues of fairness in distributed solar policy and the Obama-era Clean Power Plan; and
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Community Opposition, “NIMBYism,” and NEPA Reform

These two paths for reform—streamlining environmental law’s
procedures while empowering communities in the transition—converge
in the Administration’s upcoming rewrite of the regulations implementing
NEPA.88 But most academic and other proposals for reforming NEPA do
not offer a coherent vision for communities’ role in the transition,
particularly in the development of renewable energy projects.89 For
example, many proposed reforms would indirectly limit public input or
otherwise undermine public confidence in NEPA’s process.90 Those
reformers that do acknowledge a role for communities in a reformed

Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben, Green Power & Environmental Justice—Does Green Discriminate?,
46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1067, 1088–96 (2014), for a survey on impacts from various low-carbon energy
sources.
88. On October 10, 2021, the Council on Environmental Quality proposed “Phase I” of its revisions
to NEPA’s implementing regulations, focusing on a “discrete” set of changes where the Council
believes it “make[s] sense to revert” to the pre-2020 regulatory approach. National Environmental
Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions, 86 Fed. Reg. 55,757, 55,759 (proposed Oct. 7, 2021)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502, 1507–1508). The Council plans a forthcoming “Phase 2”
rulemaking that will “more broadly revisit the 2020 NEPA regulations” to ensure, among other things,
that NEPA meets “environmental justice objectives.” Id. at 55,759.
89. See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 67, at 10603–05 (discussing proposed reforms to NEPA); Jeffrey
Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Climate Change Urgently Requires a
Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, 42 ENV’T L. 1101, 1141–55 (2012)
(proposing reforms to NEPA and other laws to enable development of renewable energy); see also
James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST.
L.J. 263, 295 (2019) (arguing for a wide range of reforms, including to NEPA, to better enable energy
transport infrastructure); Trevor Salter, NEPA and Renewable Energy: Realizing the Most
Environmental Benefit in the Quickest Time, 34 ENVIRONS: ENV’T L. & POL’Y J. 173, 182–84 (2011).
90. For example, several propose greater use of environmental assessments, mitigated findings of
no significant impacts (mitigated FONSIs), and programmatic assessments. See, e.g., Gerrard, supra
note 67, at 10604–05. But there is no requirement to involve the public in developing the assessment
or mitigation leading up to a mitigated FONSI. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(e) (2020). Current regulations
require public involvement in the development of an assessment only to the extent “practicable.” Id.
They do not require public involvement in the development of mitigation measures, and only require
that an agency consult the public before issuing a FONSI when the action “is, or is closely similar to,
one which normally requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement,” or “is one
without precedent.” Id. § 1501.6(a)(2). Likewise, programmatic approaches have been criticized as a
“shell game,” where agencies can use a “tiering” method to exclude certain stakeholders or issues
from different levels of review. Beth C. Bryant, NEPA Compliance in Fisheries Management: The
Programmatic Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement on Alaskan Groundfish Fisheries and
Implications for NEPA Reform, 30 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 441, 453 (2006) (“Critics charge that issues
vaguely described at the programmatic level may never be adequately addressed in subsequent tiered
documents, resulting in a ‘shell game’ of when and where deferred issues will be addressed.”). These
problems are exacerbated by other flaws with these forms of review that reduce public confidence,
such as the lack of any requirement that an agency follow through with mitigation or monitor the
actual impacts of a project. See Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate Impact
Assessments: Learning from NEPA’s Flaws, 39 ENV’T L. REP. 10605, 10610 (2009).
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NEPA process do not offer details about what that should look like.91
Why? What is so complicated about involving communities in the
decision-making regarding projects that affect them?
At least part of the answer stems from the history of local communities
using NEPA to oppose renewable energy projects. Community opposition
to renewable energy projects shares two counterintuitive features. First,
local opposition to renewable energy projects seems surprising in light of
widespread and consistent public support for renewable energy.92 This
feature makes community opposition to renewable energy projects
susceptible to “not in my back yard” or “NIMBY” framing—that
communities want renewable energy, but do not want the necessary
infrastructure near them.93
However, studies on community views of renewable energy have
shown that local opposition to projects is substantially more complex than
the NIMBY framing.94 The NIMBY label therefore has important
rhetorical effects that both oversimplify and discredit the communities’

91. See, e.g., Jason Bordoff, Opinion, Will Clean Energy Projects Face Troubles That Have
Bedeviled Pipelines?, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/opinion/pi
pelines-clean-energy.html?auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/5P96-8J3M] (noting
that “communities near these projects should be included to address concerns, develop solutions and
defuse opposition” but not elaborating further); EVERGREEN ROADMAP, supra note 54, at 48 (arguing
for a “balance” between “expedite[d] environmental review for renewable energy projects and
adequate community engagement,” but not elaborating further); Irma S. Russell, Streamlining NEPA
to Combat Global Climate Change: Heresy or Necessity?, 39 ENV’T L. 1049, 1072 (2009) (noting
that community input is “indispens[a]ble” but not discussing it further within proposals to streamline
NEPA); see also Warigia M. Bowman, Dust in the Wind: Regulation as an Essential Component of
a Sustainable and Robust Wind Program, 69 KAN. L. REV. 45, 99–101 (2020) (encouraging better
community involvement in wind energy siting, but recommending that states look to NEPA as a
model for procedural requirements that allow public input).
92. One commenter, for example, refers to this as “a paradoxical quality” of local opposition to
renewable energy. Ori Sharon, Fields of Dreams: An Economic Democracy Framework for
Addressing NIMBYism, 49 ENV’T L. REP. 10264, 10267 (2019) (quoting Michael Wheeler,
Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. ON
REGUL. 241, 249 (1994)).
93. See, e.g., id. at 12067 (noting a “social gap”); K.K. DuVivier & Thomas Witt, NIMBY to
NOPE—or YESS?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1453, 1462 (2017) (defining NIMBYs along these lines);
Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms and NIMBYs: Generating Conflict, Reducing Litigation, 20
FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 427, 428–29 (2010) (same); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow,
Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1049, 1051–52 (2009) (same).
94. See Sharon, supra note 92, at 10267 (noting that “a growing volume of studies suggests that
the concept of NIMBY fails to adequately characterize the drivers of local opposition”); Joseph Rand
& Ben Hoen, Thirty Years of North American Wind Energy Acceptance Research: What Have We
Learned?, 29 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 135, 138 (2017) (noting that “many researchers now agree
that the NIMBY framework is overly simplistic and unable to explain the complex motivations,
concerns, and perceptions that can lead to opposition and negative attitudes”).
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concerns with a proposed project.95 For example, NIMBY opposition is
characterized as selfish and short-sighted.96 And NIMBY opposition is
typically characterized as opposition from white and wealthy
communities.97 Because of these connotations, labeling community
opposition as NIMBY opposition can erase diverse perspectives within
communities, especially perspectives of low-income people or people of
color, while collectively trivializing community concerns.98
For these reasons, the NIMBY narrative has been “widely discredited”
in social science literature “as simplistic, pejorative, politically
inappropriate, and unhelpful as a framework to explain public attitudes”
towards renewable energy development.99 Rather, studies show the
importance of contextualized and meaningful community engagement—
and particularly the value of building trust and giving communities
influence over key decisions in the project—as better guides for
community support.100 Nevertheless, NIMBY opposition persists in legal
95. See Rand & Hoen, supra note 94, at 138 (noting that NIMBY “is generally used pejoratively”
and is “politically inappropriate[,] and can often lead to misunderstanding, adding little value to the
decision-making process”).
96. See, e.g., Kate Burningham, Julie Barnett & Gordon Walker, An Array of Deficits: Unpacking
NIMBY Discourses in Wind Energy Developers’ Conceptualizations of Their Local Opponents, 28
SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 246, 247 (2015) (NIMBY “is a pejorative shorthand to denote irrational, selfish,
and obstructive individuals who fear change and stand in the way of essential developments. NIMBYs
are considered parochial individuals who place the protection of their individual interests above the
common good”).
97. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and
“Justice”, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 281 n.297 (1997) [hereinafter Kaswan, Bridging the Gap] (“The
‘NIMBY’ responses of wealthy and powerful communities are considered one of the causes of the
disproportionate distribution of undesirable facilities in poor and minority areas.”); Warren L. Ratliff,
The De-Evolution of Environmental Organization, 17 J. LAND RES. & ENV’T L. 45, 69 (1997) (noting
that “NIMBY groups are a predominantly suburban phenomenon,” as distinct from low-income
communities or communities of color).
98. See Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 522 (1994)
[hereinafter Gerrard, Victims of NIMBY] (“All forms of local opposition are often lumped together
under the pejorative and trivializing label NIMBY.”).
99. Rand & Hoen, supra note 94, at 143.
100. See id. (noting, among other lessons, that a “planning process that is perceived as ‘fair’ can
lead to greater toleration of the outcome, even if it does not fully satisfy all stakeholders” and that
“[m]ore participatory processes may increase trust and support”); PATRICK DEVINE WRIGHT,
HANNAH DEVINE WRIGHT & RICHARD COWELL, WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT OVERCOMING
BARRIERS TO SITING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN LOCAL AREAS? 5 (2016),
https://orca.cf.ac.uk/93905/1/DECC_Infrastructure_PlacewiseLtd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQP4WF8V] (noting that “[s]uccessful [project] placement is associated with legitimacy and trust, which
can be fostered by early dialogue and engagement” with communities, that demonstrating how
community “input changed infrastructure proposals can increase trust and social acceptance,” and
projects work better “if developers site and design them in ways that work with, rather than against,
local identities”). For a legal scholar arguing for greater sensitivity to community concerns in
renewable energy siting disputes, see Alexa Burt Engelman, Against the Wind: Conflict over Wind
Energy Siting, 41 ENV’T L. REP. 10549, 10561 (2011).
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scholarship as the dominant characterization of community opposition to
renewable energy development.101
This NIMBY narrative feeds into the second counterintuitive feature of
local opposition to renewable energy projects: that environmental laws
can serve as a barrier to renewable energy projects. Renewable energy
projects carry important environmental benefits but also environmental
impacts to local communities and wildlife that can generate conflicts
between competing environmental values.102 These “green versus green”
conflicts highlight competing mandates in environmental law and the
outdated nature of the relevant statutory schemes in an increasingly
complex era of environmental harm and climate change.103
A classic example of this effect are conflicts between rigid legal
protections for endangered species and renewable energy development.104
Transitioning away from fossil fuels and mitigating the worst effects of
climate change would broadly benefit endangered species.105 But
renewable energy developments can cause localized harms, such as the
impacts that wind turbines can have on endangered bats and birds, that
trigger legal protections which hinder or outright prohibit renewable
energy development.106 While these conflicts are not irresolvable, they
can result in delays and uncertainty.107 These conflicts within
environmental law can add to the “opportunistic” characterization of local
opposition to renewable energy projects—community claims appear to

101. Michael B. Gerrard, The Role of Lawyers in Decarbonizing Society, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
112, 120 (2020) (“Objections by local stakeholders, commonly referred to as ‘NIMBY’ (Not in My
Backyard) opposition, has become a significant obstacle.”); see also DuVivier & Witt, supra note 93,
at 1462 (noting NIMBY challenges to renewable energy); Lorde Martin, supra note 93, at 446–62
(same); Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 93, at 1067–72 (same).
102. See, e.g., Zokovitch Paben, supra note 87, at 1088–96 (noting potential environmental justice
impacts of wind, solar, and biomass energy and biofuels); Nagle, supra note 74, at 61–73 (noting
biodiversity, scenic, water, noise, cultural, and other harms of “green” projects); Ruhl, Harmonizing
Wind Power, supra note 75, at 1771 (noting wildlife impacts of wind power); Uma Outka, The
Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 241, 247–54 (2011) (discussing land impacts of
renewable energy development).
103. See Ruhl, Harmonizing Wind Power, supra note 75, at 1773 (articulating a “green versus
green” conflict between wildlife protection and renewable energy).
104. See id. (using “commercial utility-scale land-based wind power generation as the case study”
to examine conflicts between renewable energy and endangered species law).
105. See id. at 1788–89, 1798 (briefly noting the “the holistic benefits wind power offers to all
species,” and later arguing “the ameliorative benefits of wind power should be recognized within”
endangered species regulation).
106. See id. at 1799 (“The overall environmental benefits of wind power, however, are of little
direct and immediate value to an endangered bird struck by a wind turbine. If anything, therefore, the
color blindness of the [Endangered Species Act] is what defines the statute.”).
107. Id. at 1776–88 (detailing regulatory advances to address conflicts between endangered species
laws and renewable energy development, but also noting litigation and other project delays).
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leverage the letter of environmental law against its spirit.108
NEPA is particularly susceptible to this critique, as its procedures have
long been criticized as both unnecessarily burdensome to renewable
energy projects and a principal tool for NIMBY opposition.109 The
confluence of these features in NEPA reform debates creates a dominant
narrative that presents NEPA’s public-participation requirements as a
vehicle for opportunistic attempts by mostly white, wealthy communities
to delay and obstruct renewable energy development in a time of national
urgency.110 It is this narrative that complicates the role of communities in
a reformed NEPA.
Cape Wind, an infamous offshore wind energy project, offers a good
example of this narrative in action. Initially proposed in 2001, Cape Wind
would have been the first utility-scale offshore wind development in the
United States.111 The project would have located 130 wind turbines in the
Nantucket Sound off the coast of Massachusetts.112 The project faced local
opposition from a wide range of parties including Native American tribes,
the local fishing industry, coastal municipalities, and wealthy and
politically powerful landowners such as Ed Kennedy and Bill Koch.113
Despite this opposition, the project generally succeeded in receiving the
necessary regulatory approvals and in defending those approvals in
court.114 But the novelty of the project and community opposition made
the regulatory process especially lengthy and arduous.115 In 2015, two
utilities backed out of their agreements to purchase electricity from the
project, throwing the project’s future in doubt.116 Federal regulators
108. See id. at 1788 (“We know that wind power is going to be a key player in the quest for
renewable energy, and that renewable energy will be a key player in the quest to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, so shouldn’t [the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service] get the [Endangered Species Act] out
of the way of saving the planet?”); see also Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 97, at 271 (noting
that environmental laws are “frequently used to accomplish” NIMBY opposition).
109. See Binder, supra note 39, at 45 (“NEPA has become a tool of the NIMBY movement.”).
110. See infra notes 117–119.
111. See Kenneth Kimmell & Dawn Stolfi Stalenhoef, The Cape Wind Offshore Wind Energy
Project: A Case Study of the Difficult Transition to Renewable Energy, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T
L.J. 197, 198 (2011).
112. Id. at 199–200.
113. See id. at 201–02 (highlighting the opposition of the Kennedys and Kochs).
114. See, e.g., Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(rejecting challenges to Cape Wind’s permits and approvals).
115. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), shifted the lead agency that was responsible for NEPA
compliance in the Cape Wind project, effectively restarting the process several years in. See Kimmell
& Stalenhoef, supra note 111, at 205–06.
116. Jim O’Sullivan, Two Utilities Opt out of Cape Wind, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6, 2015, 7:31 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/01/06/major-setback-for-cape-wind-project/kggnYeAXR
j03PyfIUn2iIM/story.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
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finalized all approvals in 2017, but the developer announced it would
abandon the project later that year.117
Cape Wind’s failure defies any one explanation. Delays in the project
were a result of many different issues, including diverse and wide-ranging
community concerns and a lack of regulatory structure for offshore
wind.118 Nevertheless, Cape Wind is characterized as the “poster child” of
“[l]ocal NIMBY opposition.”119 Its failure is frequently oversimplified as
white, wealthy landowners (particularly Bill Koch) opportunistically
using environmental laws (including NEPA) to advance their own
goals.120 Some opposition to Cape Wind did undeniably match the
NIMBY narrative. Bill Koch was candid about and his intent to fund
groups that would use environmental laws to delay the project, as well as
his motivation to protect his expensive property’s coastal views.121 But
focusing only on this kind of opposition to explain Cape Wind’s failure
shows how the NIMBY narrative can obscure complexity and diversity in
community concerns with a project, as well as the potential value that

117. Cape Wind, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/renewableenergy/studies/cape-wind [https://perma.cc/A64Q-4BGJ] (noting that Cape Wind’s development
announced it would relinquish its lease in December 2017, and did so in May 2018).
118. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Room for a (Sacred) View? American Indian Tribes Confront
Visual Desecration Caused by Wind Energy Projects, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 333, 336–72 (2014)
(detailing the involvement of the Wampanoag Nation, and specifically the Aquinnah and Mashpee
Wampanoag tribes, in the Cape Wind project, and how, for example, the tribes’ advocacy led the
federal Advisory Council for Historic Preservation to recommend that the lead federal agency not
approve the Cape Wind).
119. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 58, at 713 (calling Cape Wind the “poster child” for “[l]ocal
NIMBY opposition”).
120. See, e.g., Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 111, at 198–202 (concluding that Cape Wind
“was held captive by the permitting process for nearly a decade” because “of disproportionally
rigorous regulatory scrutiny and the dogged political pressure applied by a few wealthy homeowners
with ocean views in the direction of the proposed wind farm”). For a particularly impassioned
argument that the “true reason” for opposition to Cape Wind is NIMBYism, see M.W. Marinakos, A
Mighty Wind: The Turbulent Times of America’s First Offshore Wind Farm and the Inverse of
Environmental Justice, 2 BARRY U. EARTH L. & ENV’T JUST. J. 82, 85–86 (2012).
121. See Ros Davidson, Cape Wind: Requiem for a Dream, WINDPOWER MONTHLY (May 1, 2018),
https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1462962/cape-wind-requiem-dream
[https://perma.cc/QJ28-F7T8] (“Cape Wind had the particular misfortune to draw the ire of oil
billionaire Bill Koch, who in 2013 had spent $19.5 million buying the waterfront estate of heiress
Bunny Mellon, another opponent of the wind project. Koch soon wanted to combat what he called
the project’s ‘visual pollution.’ Indeed, Koch was the main financier behind—and president of—the
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (APNS), a non-profit organisation specifically founded to
oppose Cape Wind that raised $40 million. In a 2013 interview with Massachusetts’ CommonWealth
Magazine, Koch described his strategy on Cape Wind as: ‘Delay, delay, delay.’ The alliance was
legally savvy, at one point even hiring a renowned constitutional scholar and attorney, Larry Tribe.”);
see also id. (“In all fairness, the relentless opposition to the project included lawsuits filed by local
Native American tribes, ordinary fishermen and residents, and tourism-related interests, albeit often
backed by APNS.”).
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community engagement requirements can offer in addressing those
concerns. As a common example in proposals to reform NEPA, Cape
Wind helps show how this dominant NIMBY narrative has limited the
scope of NEPA reform debates.122
To be clear, express calls to limit public participation in NEPA’s
process because of local opposition to renewable energy projects are
rare.123 Rather, the central problem is that reformers do not match
proposals to improve NEPA’s process for renewable energy projects with
a vision of how to incorporate communities into this improved process.124
Here, the dominance of the NIMBY narrative in NEPA reform debates
offers an explanation. By oversimplifying communities as potential
threats to rapid decarbonization, the narrative complicates their role in
reform proposals. For example, some decarbonization advocates argue
that public participation must be “balance[d]” against the urgency of the
task.125 This dynamic renders the reform debate susceptible to tradeoffs
between community empowerment and urgency—susceptible to the
climate change fundamentalism that Professor Baker warned of.126
II.

NEPA’S POTENTIAL AS A TOOL FOR COMMUNITY
EMPOWERMENT

The central goal of this Article is to offer a vision for communities’ role
in a reformed NEPA process that enables rapid decarbonization. This
vision seeks to use this moment of reform to revitalize NEPA as a tool for
empowering communities in decarbonization and enforcing that
commitment across federal agencies. Understanding how NEPA’s
participatory and enforcement structures can be linked to support one
another requires a bit of history and context, as does understanding

122. See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 67, at 10600 (noting “the tortuous path followed by the Cape
Wind project,” and listing citizen opposition to the project); Thaler, supra note 89, at 1135 (arguing
that the “NEPA process imposes a significant time and financial burden, as demonstrated by the Cape
Wind project” and that “citizen groups opposing the project initiated numerous court challenges based
on alleged NEPA violations and other grounds, further augmenting an already time-consuming and
costly process”).
123. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 58, at 719–20 (arguing that a highly democratized and
participatory transition to renewable is incompatible with emissions-reduction timelines because it
would replicate “the Cape Wind story many times over”).
124. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., EVERGREEN ROADMAP, supra note 54, at 48 (“As CEQ under a Biden
Administration seeks to reverse Trump Administration rollbacks to the environmental review process
under the National Environmental Policy Act, it should ensure that a balance is struck between the
imperative to expedite environmental review for renewable energy projects and adequate community
engagement.” (emphasis in original)).
126. Baker, supra note 80, at 15–20 (describing “climate change fundamentalism”).
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NEPA’s past and future potential as a tool for advancing environmental
justice and community empowerment. This Part therefore briefly offers
this background. Section II.A discusses the misfit between NEPA’s
intended structure and current form. Section II.B then discusses NEPA’s
potential as a tool for community empowerment, drawing on the statute’s
history as a tool for advancing environmental justice.
A.

NEPA’s Structural Misfit

Although public participation and citizen-led judicial review are now
essential characteristics of NEPA’s process, neither is reflected in the
statute’s structure nor was intended by NEPA’s drafters.127 Rather,
NEPA’s principal purpose was to redirect federal agency decisions in
accordance with NEPA’s newly announced national environmental
policy.128 The key problem NEPA’s drafters were trying to solve was that
the federal bureaucracy was making a huge range of decisions affecting
the environment without guiding principles or coordination.129 Congress
127. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Is NEPA Inherently Self-Defeating?, 9 ENV’T L. REP. 50001, 50001
(1979) (noting, as one of NEPA’s primary drafters, that “NEPA is not primarily (a) a full disclosure
law; (b) a vehicle for citizen involvement; or (c) a regulation of agency procedures. The Act
contributes importantly to each of these objectives, but they are incidental to its main purpose and
none were primary reasons for its enactment” (emphasis in original)). NEPA’s original purpose and
transformation into its current form has been extensively covered elsewhere. Sam Kalen’s work, in
particular, provides an excellent overview of NEPA’s intended purposes and transition to a procedural
statute. See Kalen, Lost Mandate, supra note 35 (discussing NEPA’s intended purposes); see also
Sam Kalen, The Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed the Nation’s Environmental Policy,
33 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 483 (2009) [hereinafter Kalen, Devolution of NEPA]
(contextualizing judicial interpretation of NEPA as a procedural statute); Houck, supra note 33
(offering a candidly pessimistic view of NEPA’s intended purposes).
128. See, e.g., Kalen, Lost Mandate¸ supra note 35, at 118–19 (“Congress did not intend that NEPA
would serve only an information disclosure function. Rather, Congress more significantly intended to
embrace and employ ecology—however it understood the concept—and expected that its policy
statement and declaration would serve as a substantive mandate for federal agencies. Congress further
expected that CEQ would perform a proactive role in both environmental management and
coordination of federal decisionmaking.”); Lindstrom, supra note 35, at 249 (“The framers of NEPA
intended to substantively redirect the goals and policy decisions generated within federal agencies so
that, collectively, the nation would recognize the importance of environmental assets along with other
national interests. The framers’ intention was also to challenge the gridlock and fragmentation of
environmental policy-making.”); Weiland, supra note 35, at 281–82 (“The legislative history of
NEPA provides a clear indication of the framers’ intent when they drafted the Act” to “provide federal
decisionmakers with a statutory referent when they are confronted with a situation in which they must
balance competing economic, environmental, political, and social concerns.”).
129. See Kalen, Lost Mandate¸ supra note 35, at 133 n.85 (noting that Bill Van Ness, a central
player in NEPA’s drafting, said “controversies over the Central Arizona Project and the Colorado
River during the Johnson administration had convinced Jackson that the nation sorely needed
comprehensive legislation to establish national priorities on the environment and to coordinate the
activities of the federal government” (quoting ROBERT G. KAUFMAN, HENRY M. JACKSON: A LIFE IN
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therefore announced guiding principles—a national environmental
policy—and included “action-forcing” requirements that it hoped would
induce agencies to follow those principles.130 But Congress also expected
agency resistance, and designed NEPA to bring recalcitrant agencies in
line through high-level oversight within the executive branch facilitated
by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an agency created by
NEPA within the Executive Office of the President.131
NEPA’s structure and central features reflect this executive-oversight
system. The requirement that agencies prepare an “environmental report”
that eventually became the centerpiece of NEPA’s process, for example,
was intended not only to force the relevant agency to assess the impact of
its decisions but also as a tool that would allow overseers higher within
the executive branch to assess the agency’s action for compliance with
Congress’s policy.132 And CEQ’s unique structure as a legislatively
created agency within the Executive Office of the President reflected
Congress’s desire to create a durable and independent advisor to help the
President implement NEPA’s principles.133 Congress expressly rejected,
for example, proposals from the Nixon Administration for a council of
agency heads to implement NEPA, believing that an independent advisor
would be an important counter to resistance within the federal

POLITICS 202 (2000))); see also Daniel F. Luecke, The National Environmental Policy Act, the Path
to Two Forks, and Beyond, 22 U. DENVER WATER L. REV. 467, 470 (2019) (explaining that Jackson
“saw agency plans and projects as conflicted with one another (the Everglades being an example that
pitted the Corps of Engineers against the National Park Service)”).
130. See Caldwell, supra note 127, at 50001–02 (describing NEPA as “a policy act. Its purpose
was to state for the first time and in a single place, a comprehensive national commitment to protection
of the environment and to back up that commitment with a corresponding reorientation of specific
policies and programs of the administrative agencies of the United States government” (emphasis in
original)).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342–4347 (creating the Council on Environmental Quality); see also William
L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA’s Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation
of Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L.J. 205, 222 (1989) (discussing NEPA’s executive oversight
structure and noting that NEPA’s framers “fully anticipated high-level executive branch oversight”).
132. Hearing on S. 1075, S. 257 and S. 1752 Before the Comm. on Interior & Insular Affs., 91st
Cong. 116 (1969) (statement of Lynton K. Caldwell, Professor of Government, University of Indiana)
(noting that the requirement for agencies to evaluate and document that evaluation was to allow
executive overseers to “scrutinize” proposed agency actions for compliance with Congress’s policy).
133. John Hart, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Battle for Control of
Environmental Policy, 31 J. POL’Y HIST. 464, 471, 475–82 (2019) (collecting views on the
independence of CEQ, noting that: “[i]n essence, it was meant to focus primarily on providing policy
advice to the president, but it was also given a brief to oversee environmental policy across the
departments and agencies”); see also id. at 478 (noting the view of one of NEPA’s key framers that
CEQ was an “institutional device through which the president would share environmental
policymaking with the Congress”).
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bureaucracy.134 Given expected agency resistance to NEPA’s mandate,
the bill’s framers joked in committee that serving on CEQ would make
you so unpopular in Washington as to end your career.135
There are also signals that Congress expressly rejected a role for the
public in enforcing NEPA’s requirements.136 For example, an initial
version of the law included a provision that recognized each person’s right
to a healthy environment.137 This provision was removed out of concern
that it would authorize individual people to enforce NEPA’s requirements
in court.138 Sam Kalen has argued that this was a proto-citizen-suit
provision, a model for citizen enforcement of environmental laws that was
included in later environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act.139 In
NEPA, however, this approach was set aside in favor of the executiveoversight model.
Nevertheless, NEPA’s executive oversight structure quickly failed.
While the Nixon Administration initially supported NEPA and CEQ, it
soured on both shortly after NEPA became law.140 Without White House
support, CEQ folded under immense resistance to NEPA’s objectives
from the federal bureaucracy.141 As Oliver Houck explained, “it is hard to
134. Id. at 475–78 (explaining that Jackson was “absolutely clear” on the need for CEQ and that
his views “directly countered” the Nixon Administration’s proposal); see also Andreen, supra note
131, at 217 (“Senator Jackson agreed and stressed the importance of locating such a council in the
Executive Office of the President in order to provide an effective counterpoint to the more parochial
views of the established agencies.”).
135. Hearing on S. 1075, S. 257 and S. 1752 Before the Comm. on Interior & Insular Affs., supra
note 132 (statement of Lynton K. Caldwell, Professor of Government, University of Indiana).
136. See Kalen, Lost Mandate, supra note 35, at 141–42.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 145–46, 153–56.
139. Id. at 145 n.139.
140. See Kalen, Devolution of NEPA, supra note 127, at 503 (noting that the “Nixon administration
arguably became hostile to” NEPA and used the 1970s energy crisis as “cover” to undercut
environmental programs); see also Hart, supra note 133, at 467 (noting that, while CEQ “got off to
an impressive start,” Nixon’s “enthusiasm for the council was not sustained for very long”). Nixon’s
relationship with environmental issues is complex, but one common explanation is that Nixon viewed
his administration’s support for environmental issues instrumentally and lost interest in them when
he no longer believed there were politically advantageous. See generally Meir Rinde, Richard Nixon
and the Rise of American Environmentalism, SCI. HIST. INST. (June 2, 2017),
https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/richard-nixon-and-the-rise-of-americanenvironmentalism [https://perma.cc/6NCV-DSV7] (detailing Nixon’s approach to environmental
issues and noting that at “a 1970 White House meeting with leading environmentalists, [Nixon] began
by lecturing them: ‘All politics is a fad. Your fad is going right now. Get what you can, and here’s
what I can get you’”).
141. See Kalen, Devolution of NEPA, supra note 127, at 502–03 (noting the “backlash against”
NEPA that “surfaced in some of the Federal agencies” that lead the White House to turn “hostile to”
the statute); Weiland, supra note 35, at 285 (“The ability of the CEQ to play a prominent role in
national policymaking has been hampered by the existence of an often hostile political environment
within the EOP.”).
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appreciate the degree of opposition and hostility NEPA faced within the
government, even to the clearly required impact statement process.”142 For
example, one agency division chief chastised its staff for using the word
“disturbed” in NEPA statements to describe land damaged by coal
mining.143 “These are the words used by the Sierra Club, Friends of the
Earth, environmentalists, homosexuals, ecologists and other ideological
eunuchs opposed to developing mineral resources,” the division chief
explained, and went on to prohibit the division’s staff from using such
“inflammatory words.”144
CEQ’s collapse in the face of such resistance was rapid and public.
Within a year of NEPA’s passage, senators were publicly pressuring CEQ
to force agencies to submit the statements required by NEPA and to
enforce the Act’s mandate against agencies that submitted inadequate
statements.145 CEQ responded that it was “not satisfied” with its own
performance but simply could not do what the senators asked.146 CEQ’s
collapse permeated all aspects of the government, even the courts. In
1973, for example, Justice Douglas published a dissent highlighting
CEQ’s role as “expert ombudsman” and bemoaning “the current practice
of federal agencies to undermine the policy announced by Congress in
NEPA.”147
The general failure of NEPA’s executive oversight structure had two
important consequences for our purposes here. First, dissatisfaction with
CEQ prompted Congress to reassign primary responsibility for policing
compliance with NEPA from CEQ to the newly created U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Senator Edmund Muskie, a
prominent competitor within the Senate to NEPA’s lead sponsor, led a
legislative push that culminated in the transfer of authority to EPA under
Section 309 of the Clean Air Act of 1970.148 In contrast with CEQ’s
“passive” oversight, Muskie wanted EPA to take initiative.149
142. Houck, supra note 33, at 185 n.48.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. E.W. Kenworthy, Hart Prods Nixon on Environment Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1970, at 16,
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/11/19/archives/hart-prods-nixon-on-environment-act.html
[https://perma.cc/9Q8P-X68C].
146. Id.
147. United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Agency Procs. (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 713–14
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
148. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q);
Andreen, supra note 131, at 223–30; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7609.
149. Andreen, supra note 131, at 228, 230 (“Section 309, according to Senator Muskie, made EPA
‘a self-starter, whenever you, unilaterally, see an environmental risk. You are given the responsibility
to raise the red flag.’”).
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EPA’s responsibility for reviewing agency actions under section 309 is
obligatory and far-reaching, extending to any matter relevant to EPA’s
broad environmental-protection mission.150 EPA can self-start a review
even if an agency believes that its action does not trigger NEPA’s
requirements. 151 And EPA’s review is “substantive” in the sense that it is
not limited to the agency’s compliance with the procedural requirement
of preparing an environmental statement.152 EPA can comment on any
aspect of the environmental and public health repercussions of an
agency’s decision and can refer anything it finds unsatisfactory to CEQ.153
As one commenter summarized, section 309 “was designed to create an
advocate within the executive branch that would blow the whistle on
harmful environmental actions and press the case against such actions all
the way to the Executive Office of the President.”154
But EPA’s oversight responsibility under section 309 has been
hindered by regulatory design. Current regulations only allow EPA to
refer disputes prior to an agency’s ultimate decision.155 As a result, the
few disputes that are referred to CEQ tend to focus on preparation of the
environmental impact statement, despite EPA’s much broader mandate
under section 309.156 All told, EPA and CEQ currently have limited ability
under the current regime to influence the ultimate outcome of any agency
decision.
The second consequence of agency resistance was early emphasis on
enforcing NEPA’s procedural requirements. Even as NEPA was moving
through Congress, early environmental litigators were brainstorming
ways to leverage judicial power to protect the environment.157 Agency
refusal to comply with NEPA’s requirements provided these early
litigators with strong test cases. Turning to the Administrative Procedure
150. Id. at 226 (noting that section 309 “ordered EPA to comment in writing on all federal actions
relating to EPA’s duties and responsibilities”); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR. & ELIZABETH
BURLESON, RODGERS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7:14 (2d ed. 2021).
151. Andreen, supra note 131, at 228–29; see also RODGERS & BURLESON, supra note 150.
152. RODGERS & BURLESON, supra note 150.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 7609.
154. Andreen, supra note 131, at 229.
155. See 40 C.F.R. § 1504 (2020) (providing for “pre-decision” referrals to CEQ); see also
Andreen, supra note 131, at 257 (noting that CEQ “has in effect prohibited” post-decision referrals).
156. Andreen, supra note 131, at 241, 256 (“The referral system, as established by CEQ, is largely
geared to the production of better environmental information documents rather than better decisions,”
and as a result, “[t]he full potential of section 309, however, has yet to be realized”); see also
RODGERS & BURLESON, supra note 150, § 7:15 (concluding that “[i]n recent years, section 309 has
achieved an equilibrium of mostly talk,” that “[r]eferrals do not happen,” and that issues raised by
EPA “occasionally are mentioned in court decisions but without serious consequence”).
157. See Kalen, Lost Mandate, supra note 35, at 123–24, 133–34 (discussing the Airlie Conference
and early environmental litigators’ role).
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Act’s cause of action, these litigators sought to enforce NEPA’s
procedural requirements against agencies—chief among them the
statutory requirement to prepare an environmental impact statement.158
These procedural requirements put the litigators on stronger legal ground,
while also pushing the courts towards NEPA’s larger policy goals.
CEQ’s early focus on environmental impact statements, including the
introduction of public comments, supported this legal strategy. The
beleaguered agency initially focused its efforts on the environmental
impact statement, largely in response to an order from President Nixon to
help clarify the process.159 One innovation of this period was to introduce
public comment during the preparation of the statement, a subtle change
that would come to define much of NEPA’s process.160 But by the time
CEQ issued formal regulations in 1978, it had come to regret this early
emphasis. CEQ admitted that its early focus on procedures had misled
many into believing that preparing the environmental statement was “an
end in itself, rather than a means to making better decisions” that reflect
NEPA’s policy mandate.161 This attempted course correction turned out
to be too little too late.
The litigators’ reliance on NEPA’s procedural requirements ultimately
proved their undoing in the courts. The litigators won early successes,
advancing important features of NEPA’s process through judicial
decisions.162 Some of these successes were dramatic, promising an
important role for judicial oversight of NEPA’s policy beyond simply its
procedures.163 Judge Skelly Wright’s famous decision in Calvert Cliffs’
158. Kalen, Devolution of NEPA, supra note 127, at 489, 501–45 (explaining that “Congress most
likely intended that its newly adopted national policy for the environment would not create a private
cause of action against individual polluters,” and extensively detailing NEPA litigation under the
APA); see also, e.g., Lindstrom, supra note 35, at 255–62 (reviewing NEPA’s litigation proceeded
under the APA).
159. Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 3(h), 3 C.F.R § 904 (1966–1970) (requiring CEQ to issue
regulations “for the implementation of the procedural provisions” of NEPA, and specifically about
the “environmental impact statement process”); see also Andreen, supra note 131, at 230 (“Consistent
with the executive order, the guidelines primarily addressed the development of the impact statement
process.”); Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA’s Promise—Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENV’T L. 533, 538 n.24 (1990)
(former general counsel of CEQ asserting that the Executive Order 11,514 restricted “the scope of the
earlier CEQ guidelines” to section 102(2)(C)).
160. See Statements on Proposed Actions Affecting the Environment, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7726
(Apr. 23, 1971) (providing at § 10(b) for public comment on draft environmental impact statements);
id. (providing at § 10(e) for public hearings).
161. National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,978 (July 30, 1979).
162. See Kalen, Devolution of NEPA, supra note 127, at 501–10 (noting NEPA’s development
under a “common-law case-by-case approach” and focusing on administrative law developments).
163. Id. at 501–09 (discussing Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and the early role for courts in enforcing NEPA);
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Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,164 for
example, noted that Congress did not intend NEPA to be “a paper tiger”
and that the statute’s requirements “must be rigorously enforced by the
reviewing courts.”165 Many saw Calvert Cliffs and decisions like it as
staking out an important role for the judiciary in environmental
protection.166
But the litigators’ reliance on NEPA’s procedures ultimately permitted
the Supreme Court to nip this ambition in the bud. As Richard Lazarus
has documented, then-Justice Rehnquist almost single-handedly limited
NEPA’s potential through deft maneuvering within the Supreme Court.167
Rehnquist successfully prevented the Court from adopting expansive
views of the judicial role in enforcing NEPA exemplified by Calvert
Cliffs, and ultimately set up the Court’s holding that NEPA was
“essentially procedural.”168 The Court held that, so long as an agency
complies with NEPA’s specific procedures, there was no judicial role in
questioning the agency’s ultimate decision.169
In the midst of Rehnquist’s campaign within the Court against NEPA,
CEQ published its canonical 1978 NEPA regulations.170 Issued at the

Houck, supra note 33, at 184 (noting that the 1978 CEQ regulations “milked every possible obligation
out of NEPA and its accompanying—and by that time, somewhat conflicting—case law”).
164. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
165. Id. at 1114.
166. See Kalen, Devolution of NEPA, supra note 127, at 509 (“Judge Wright’s interpretation of
NEPA [in Calvert Cliffs] offered considerable latitude for future courts to address the scope of the
new Act.”); Houck, supra note 33, at 181–82 (describing Calvert Cliffs as one of “two great
coincidences” that gave NEPA relevance); see also Harold Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 520 (1974) (a classic early article
on judicial authority in environmental cases discussing the “importance of the ruling in Calvert
Cliffs’”).
167. Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A
Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1577–85 (2012) (noting Justice
Rehnquist’s “clear, consistent vision” that NEPA imposed no substantive influence on agency
decisions and that “he skillfully and persistently promoted that vision in authoring opinions and in
commenting on the opinions authored by others on the Court”).
168. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)
(“NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is
essentially procedural.”); Lazarus, supra note 167, at 1577–84 (describing Rehnquist’s influence,
including in the Vermont Yankee opinion, and noting that “[t]he ‘essentially procedural’ point also
appears to have been one of Rehnquist’s own making. It has no clear derivation in any of the written
briefs submitted or oral arguments presented by the parties”).
169. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980) (“[O]nce
an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a court
is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’” (quoting
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976))).
170. 40 C.F.R. § 1500–1518 (1978).
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order of President Carter, these regulations largely codified the judicial
successes won by early environmental litigators.171 They included a
variety of procedural requirements that citizens could use to criticize
agency environmental decision-making before the courts, and therefore
influence environmental decision-making during the administrative
process through threats of litigation.172 It was in these regulations that
CEQ expressed its regret for relying too heavily on NEPA’s procedures,
and sought to elevate NEPA’s guiding principles in the regulatory
requirements.173 These regulations ultimately “became” NEPA for
practitioners.174
Tension between the 1978 regulations and Supreme Court precedent
put NEPA in a kind of limbo. Despite CEQ’s attempt to reinvigorate
NEPA through the 1978 regulations, the Supreme Court’s ruling that, so
long as the agency followed the rules, its ultimate decision was
unassailable before the courts cabined the regulations’ influence. The
result was a kind of empty procedure—an obligation for agencies to
follow the rules but not the spirit of NEPA. An obligation to study the
environmental impacts of its decisions, but no obligation to make the most
environmentally beneficial decision. An obligation to take comments
from the affected communities, but no obligation to act on the
communities’ input when making its decision.175 Indeed, many defended
NEPA for its innovations bringing the public into environmental decisionmaking. But views on the effect of these public participation provisions
range from them being “virtually meaningless” to having “some effect”
based largely on the agency’s desire not to be perceived as ignoring the
public.176 This result has made NEPA a poor fit for achieving either its

171. Lazarus, supra note 167, at 1545 (“[T]hose regulations, prepared by CEQ during the Carter
Administration, reflected NEPA’s high water mark. They in effect codified and extended some of the
most expansive judicial precedent environmentalists had championed during the 1970s.”).
172. Id.
173. National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,978 (July 30, 1979)
(explaining that “the environmental impact statement has tended to become an end in itself, rather
than a means to making better decisions” by failing “to establish the link between what is learned
through the NEPA process and how the information can contribute to decisions which further national
environmental policies and goals” and promulgating new requirements by regulation to “correct these
problems”).
174. Houck, supra note 33, at 184.
175. See Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1128
(2003) (“But, NEPA does not impose a duty on the decision-maker to consider the views of the
community, much less the environmental impacts identified in the environmental review process. So
long as the public is allowed to participate, the decision-maker is free to decide where and how to
locate a facility, without regard to the sentiments expressed in the public participation process.”
(footnote omitted)).
176. Id. at 1130; see id. nn.459–60 (summarizing views and collecting sources).
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intended purpose of shifting the outcomes of federal decisions, or its
unintended purpose of enabling public involvement in environmental
decision-making.
Understanding this history highlights the stakes of the current moment
of NEPA reform. While decarbonization advocates have recognized
NEPA’s importance, the content of their reforms double down on NEPA’s
procedural character. An alternative vision of NEPA that seeks to leverage
both its public-participation and executive-oversight structures to
empower communities in decarbonization offers a chance to revitalize
NEPA by harmonizing its statutory structure with its modern role. As the
next Part explains, NEPA’s relatively long and disappointing history as a
tool for advancing environmental justice helps guide this vision.
B.

NEPA’s Potential

This section provides the theoretical framework and historic context for
reforms intended to leverage NEPA as a tool for community
empowerment. The section first highlights the role of community
empowerment and self-determination in claims to environmental, energy,
and climate justice, drawing out the important but limited role that public
participation processes can play in supporting broader movements for
justice. The section then briefly highlights NEPA’s disappointing history
as a tool for environmental justice, drawing out two lines of reform that
guide the proposals laid out in Part IV.
1.

Community Empowerment

This section discusses the value and limits of public participation
requirements in empowering communities and advancing movements for
racial and economic justice. At the outset, it is important to recognize that
concepts of justice in environmental, climate, and energy policy arise out
of vibrant and dynamic social movements, and are therefore dynamic
themselves.177 The policy landscape of decarbonization is also developing

177. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 459, 461 n.9 (2002) [hereinafter Foster, Devolved Collaboration] (noting the
environmental justice movement “synthesiz[es] aspirations for distributional and procedural equity,
political accountability, and social justice into an untidy theoretical framework”); Tseming Yang, The
Form and Substance of Environmental Justice: The Challenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 for Environmental Regulation, 29 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 143, 160 (2002) (“Because it is a
term that has described the goals of environmental justice activists, attempting to study an abstract
meaning runs the risk of changing the concept into one divorced from what these activists intended it
to capture and what they hoped to achieve. It should be apparent that a conception of ‘environmental
justice’ that is different from that of the movement will be significantly less useful, or of no use, in

Sassman (Do Not Delete)

2021]

12/14/2021 10:05 PM

EMPOWERMENT IN DECARBONIZATION

1543

in ways that complicate traditional frameworks of justice in these areas.178
Here, I focus on a central theme of the environmental justice movement:
community empowerment and self-determination.179 I use this framework
to draw two specific lessons relevant to public participation in
decarbonization: the necessary role of community voice in environmental
decision-making, and the importance of leveraging public participation
requirements to build capacity and support broader movements for racial
and economic justice.
Issues of justice in environmental, energy, and climate policy are
frequently articulated through distributive or procedural justice
frameworks.180 These frameworks reflect the origins of the environmental
justice movement highlighting that industry and regulators subjected
communities of color and low-income communities to more dangerous,
more polluted land uses such as waste dumps and toxic industries than
understanding the difficulties of integrating the movement’s concerns into the existing environmental
regulatory framework.”); see also Welton & Eisen, supra note 24, at 314 (noting in the specific
context of the clean energy transition “the perils of losing or transforming the voices of affected
communities as we channel their concerns into academic, analytical frames”).
178. For example, the transition to clean energy implicates new issues in rural communities. See
Welton & Eisen, supra note 24, at 360–62 (noting impacts from renewable energy to rural
communities); see also Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 280–85 (2019)
(discussing impacts of the clean energy transition); Nicholas A. Fromherz, From Consultation to
Consent: Community Approval as a Prerequisite to Environmentally Significant Projects, 116 W. VA.
L. REV. 109, 149 (2013) (same). The role of distributed electricity generation also presents novel
issues of justice. See Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift, supra note 87, at 805.
179. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole & Caroline Farrell, Structural Racism, Structural Pollution and the
Need for a New Paradigm, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265, 280 (2006) (“One of the central tenets of
the Environmental Justice movement is that communities should speak for themselves—that is, when
decisions are being made, those affected by the decisions should have a prominent place at the
table.”); Foster, Devolved Collaboration, supra note 177, at 461–62 (“Environmental justice
advocates have thus challenged environmental decision-makers to account for the distribution of
environmental benefits and burdens in environmentally vulnerable (i.e., disproportionately impacted
and disenfranchised) populations by empowering populations with a meaningful role in assessing and
managing environmental benefits and burdens in their communities.”); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment
as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 619, 654 (1992) (arguing for “community-based lawyering and the practice of empowerment”
based on poverty law practice); see also FIRST NAT’L PEOPLE OF COLOR ENV’T LEADERSHIP SUMMIT,
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1991), https://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HT8C-UDJF] (“Environmental Justice affirms the fundamental right to political,
economic, cultural and environmental self-determination of all peoples.”).
180. See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENV’T L. REP. 10681, 10683–
93 (2000) (discussing frameworks of distributive and procedural justice). Kuehn defines distributive
justice as “the right to equal treatment, that is, to the same distribution of goods and opportunities as
anyone else has or is given” and procedural justice as “the right to treatment as an equal. [This] is the
right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity, but [the right] to equal concern and
respect in the political decision about how these goods and opportunities are to be distributed.” Id. at
10683, 10688 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977)). For an example
of these frameworks in issues of clean energy, see Welton & Eisen, supra note 24, at 342–43, which
distinguishes between the substantive and procedural justice aspects of the transition to clean energy.
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white and wealthier communities.181 Responses to the environmental
justice movement sought to resolve this unfair distribution of
environmental harms and benefits, in part, by ensuring that communities
were involved in government decision-making procedures that affected
them.182
But overemphasizing these frameworks can obscure the structural role
of racism and inequality in disempowering communities.183
Environmental injustice both stems from and supports broader legacies of
racial and economic disempowerment in the United States.184
Environmental injustice in cities and urban areas, for example, has roots
in redlining—the practice of segregating people of color within
communities by limiting access to essential services or credit for home
loans—and other racist city planning practices that undercut the political
and economic power of communities of color.185 Likewise, environmental
injustice in Native American communities is linked to our national history
181. Decades of social science research has confirmed this disparity, principally on the basis of
race, across the United States. See, e.g., Paul Mohai, David Pellow, & J. Timmons Roberts,
Environmental Justice, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T RES. 405, 408–18, 425 (2009) (noting that “[h]undreds
of studies have now documented unequal exposures by race, ethnicity, and economic class”); Sheila
Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the
Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775, 787–88
(1998) [hereinafter Foster, Justice from the Ground Up] (noting how “many studies document” that
“commercial waste facilities are disproportionately located in poor communities of color. This
disparate impact and its empirical basis have provided substance to claims of environmental racism
and environmental injustice”).
182. See Foster, Devolved Collaboration, supra note 177, at 462–63 (noting government efforts to
involve communities in decision-making but critiquing those efforts as not addressing structural
barriers to meaningful participation by communities of color and low-income communities).
183. See Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 181, at 778–79 (explaining how traditional
distributive frameworks of environmental justice overlook structural barriers to community
involvement stemming from the “set of ongoing social processes which structure the political
economy of poor communities of color”).
184. See, e.g., id. at 799–800 (explaining that “segregation has intense political and economic
consequences, particularly for poor African Americans and Latinos living in inner-cities,” including
geographic, cultural, and social isolation that, “in turn, leads to economic and political
marginalization. Accordingly, the political process rarely takes the concerns of such communities
seriously, and decision-makers often ignore them altogether”). See generally Peggy M. Shepard,
Issues of Community Empowerment, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739, 745 (1994) (“The spaces in which
we live affect our spirit and actions. Oppressive physical surroundings perpetuate and reinforce their
residents' oppression. The processes by which our habitat is planned and built keeps people isolated,
disempowered and depressed.”).
185. See Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q.
721, 737 (1993) (“Environmental racism can be said to be a manifestation of the effects of
discriminatory housing and real estate policies and practices, residential segregation and limited
residential choices influenced by such discrimination, discriminatory zoning regulations and
ineffective land use polices, racial disparities in the availability of jobs and municipal services,
imbalances in political access and power, and ‘white flight’ from cities that has created racially
homogenous suburbs and impoverished cities.”).
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of colonialism and resource extraction that has similarly disempowered
these communities.186 Legacies of pollution, contamination and other
environmental injustices therefore weave together with other
manifestations of structural inequality, such as lack of access to adequate
healthcare, to further deepen inequality and political marginalization of
these communities.187 Without confronting systems of economic and
racial disempowerment more broadly, a “fair” process or “fair” result in a
specific instance can replicate broader injustices.188 Put another way,
offering communities a seat at the table is not an effective means of
advancing justice if, for example, the community does not have the
resources, expertise, or power to effectively influence the ultimate
decision.
The central claims of the environmental justice movement therefore
extend beyond fair distribution and fair process to the active
empowerment of communities of color and low-income communities.189
A justice-based approach to reform that focuses only on distributive
outcomes or procedural fairness is incomplete. Rather, justice-based
reforms should seek a fair outcome, a fair process, and to affirmatively
empower the affected community to overcome systemic barriers to racial
and economic justice.
For this reason, community empowerment is key to the transformative

186. See Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 181, at 806 (“Environmental racism
manifests itself quite differently in the case of Native Americans, reflecting a particular racial
ideology rather than measurable acts of discrimination. When tribal sovereignty is not respected,
Native-American groups often find themselves fighting racial paternalism and cultural
imperialism.”).
187. These cycles of injustices replicate abroad as well. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Change,
Race, and Migration, 1 J.L. & POL. ECON. 109, 111 (2020) (“From Cancer Alley in Louisiana to the
Pacific islands threatened by rising sea levels, carbon capitalism creates sacrifice zones populated by
racialized communities whose plight is a harbinger of the harm that will eventually befall the vast
majority of the world’s population as the planet is rendered increasingly uninhabitable. Although
greenhouse gases do not respect national borders, national elites deploy racialized systems of border
control to perpetuate the illusion that persons who are classified as white can somehow escape the
economic and ecological ravages of carbon capitalism by erecting walls and fortresses.”).
188. Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 181, at 778 (noting how a siting process that
does not address systemic barriers to participation for low-income communities and communities of
color “relies upon, and replicates, structural inequalities”).
189. Foster, Devolved Collaboration, supra note 177, at 462 (noting the goals of “empowering
populations with a meaningful role in assessing and managing environmental benefits and burdens in
their communities” and increasing “the influence of vulnerable communities in decision-making
processes by involving them at the beginning and providing them with technical and other resources
comparable to those used by risk producers”); see also Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice and the
Three Great Myths of White Americana, 14 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 573, 585 (2008)
(“Environmental justice is about power.”).
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potential of decarbonization.190 Because the transition to renewable
energy will fundamentally remake an element of American life that has
historically disempowered communities of color and low-income
communities, decarbonization offers the potential to reorient this system
away from oppression and towards empowerment.191 Such a
transformation requires guaranteeing fair outcomes, fair process, and
more—prioritizing and elevating communities of color and low-income
communities in the key decisions and benefits of decarbonization.192 Open
questions such as what counts as “renewable” energy, who benefits from
economic changes decarbonization will bring, and where the necessary
renewable energy infrastructure will be sited all emphasize
decarbonization’s transformative potential.193 Historically, communities
of color and low-income communities have been excluded from these
types of questions by the hierarchical structures of environmental and
energy policy.194 Continued focus on expert, disconnected decisionmaking risks perpetuating these mistakes.195
Legal requirements that government decision-makers engage with
communities affected by their decisions can therefore play an important
190. See Baker, supra note 80, at 24 (arguing to use “energy policy as an equity-based tool of
empowerment and system transformation”); see also Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift, supra
note 87, at 792, 805 (noting that environmental justice “principles include the right to a clean and safe
environment, antidiscrimination, self-determination, equal participation in decision making, and
equal access to resources,” and that “justice demands climate change action to reduce environmental
harms, create new energy and environmental benefits, and ‘close the [environmental justice] gap’ in
climate impacts”); Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENV’T L. 1143, 1160
(2009) [hereinafter Kaswan, Greening the Grid] (“Climate justice is not only about achieving certain
environmental or economic justice results. It is also about democratic participation—the involvement
of disadvantaged groups in developing the policies that will affect their well being.” (emphasis in
original)).
191. Baker, supra note 80, at 6 (“Energy policy, at this particular moment of transition, could
restructure society by redistributing power along lines of race and class.”).
192. See id. at 42–43 (arguing for “an anti-oppression approach to energy policy” that “advances
these notions of [procedural and substantive] justice, but goes further, taking into account the
historical injustice perpetuated within the structure of the system. In this way, equity—the notion that
historically disadvantaged groups should get additional assistance, rather than ‘equal’ assistance, in
order to level a historically uneven playing field—becomes a part of the fabric of anti-resilience”).
193. See, e.g., Welton & Eisen, supra note 24, at 330–42, 357–62 (discussing issues with who
benefits from the transition and where infrastructure is sited); Uma Outka, Environmental Justice
Issues in Sustainable Development: Environmental Justice in the Renewable Energy Transition, 19 J.
ENV’T & SUSTAINABILITY L. 60, 86–91 (2012) [hereinafter Outka, Justice in the Renewable Energy
Transition] (discussing how different conceptions of “renewable energy” can have different justice
impacts).
194. See Baker, supra note 80, at 43–44 (noting how communities historically been excluded from
policy and siting decisions).
195. Id. at 15 (noting that approaches “blind to distributive impacts” of the clean energy transition
“run the risk of masking pre-existing inequality in communities particularly vulnerable to climate
change and making it harder to confront that inequality”).

Sassman (Do Not Delete)

2021]

12/14/2021 10:05 PM

EMPOWERMENT IN DECARBONIZATION

1547

role in empowering communities if designed with broader social context
in mind.196 While environmental law is somewhat exemplary in its use of
public participation and oversight requirements, attempts to leverage
these tools to address racial and economic inequality have been
undermined by a failure to address structural barriers to meaningful
community influence over government decisions.197 This experience has
led to specific calls for reform in NEPA, as discussed in the next section.
But before turning to those calls for reform, two general lessons from this
work on environmental justice and community empowerment are worth
noting here.
The first is the irreplaceable nature of community voice in revealing
and combating structural barriers to meaningful community power. This
lesson takes on specific importance in light of proposals to use mapping
tools that try identify environmental inequality by aggregating and
visualizing demographic and environmental data to implement federal
commitments to justice in decarbonization.198 The deeply embedded
nature of inequality means such barriers are hard for experts or distant
regulators to recognize without grassroots input.199 Communities are
uniquely positioned to identify these barriers and guide solutions most
helpful to empowering them.200 For this reason, expertise-based methods
of identifying inequality, such as mapping, can be helpful tools but not
196. Id. at 43–44 (using the example of the siting of the Dakota Access Pipeline to illustrate how
stronger community role in siting decisions can help “upend[] the hierarchy hardwired into the energy
system”).
197. See, e.g., Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 181, at 831–34 (noting public
participation requirements “promise to include the public in the decision-making process” but
frequently replicate injustice by failing to address barriers to meaningful participation by racially and
economically disadvantaged communities); see also Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit:
Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 51 (1998) [hereinafter
Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit] (explaining how claims to environmental justice do not fit
dominant models of public participation in agency decision-making).
198. See Pamela King, This EPA Mapping Tool Could Reshape Environmental Justice, E&E NEWS
(Feb. 26, 2021, 1:29 PM), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2021/02/26/stories/1063726157?utm_
campaign=edition&utm_medium=email&utm_source=eenews%3Agreenwire (last visited Nov. 1,
2021) (discussing the Biden Administration’s plan to use mapping tools).
199. See Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 181, at 807–08 (“Grassroots struggles are
a window into the social relations and processes underlying distributive outcomes. To be sure, they
are not the only window into this process. Importantly, however, grassroots accounts tell a crucial
narrative that ‘reveals the particular experiences of those in social locations, experiences that cannot
be shared by those situated differently but that they must understand in order to do justice to the
others.’” (quoting Iris M. Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,
in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 120, 131 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996))).
200. See id. at 808 (“[G]rassroots struggles can help policy-makers understand the way in which
individuals in disaffected communities experience the very social and structural constraints upon
which the siting process relies.”); see also Baker, supra note 80, at 43 (noting that communities,
“particularly the most vulnerable, are best positioned to create frameworks that unburden them”).
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replacements for community voice.201 Rather, meaningful community
engagement is a necessary supplement to these kinds of expertise-based
tools.202 They must be matched with case-by-case, context-specific
methods of community engagement that properly designed public
participation requirements can provide.
The second lesson is that public participation requirements alone are
insufficient to empower communities.203 Rather, participation
requirements should be designed and implemented with a focus on
leveraging the participatory process to support broader social movements
for community empowerment.204 The environmental justice movement’s
experience showed that even well-intended participatory structures will
frequently fail to give communities meaningful influence over decisions
affecting them.205 As a result, advocates argued that participatory
processes should be designed and used to shift power to communities by,
for example, leveraging participatory provisions to build community
resources and organize political power.206 Public participation
requirements can, for example, provide communities with information,
201. The federal government’s primary tool for mapping environmental inequality is called
EJSCREEN. See What Is EJSCREEN?, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ejscreen/
what-ejscreen [https://perma.cc/6L6T-VTTR] (“EJSCREEN is an environmental justice mapping and
screening tool that provides EPA with a nationally consistent dataset and approach for combining
environmental and demographic indicators.”). Part of the Biden Administration’s environmental
justice policies expressly identified “building off” EJSCREEN to create “a Climate and
Environmental Justice Screening Tool.” See Fact Sheet on Biden Climate Plan, supra note 60.
202. See Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit, supra note 197, at 51 (noting that environmental
justice activism raises political questions and is therefore “inconsistent with an expertise-oriented
approach”).
203. See Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift, supra note 87, at 823 (noting that “[e]ven with
progressive reforms, law is a limited tool for advancing energy and environmental justice,” and
quoting environmental justice advocates that “public laws and policies constitute a ‘necessary but
insufficient condition for ensuring . . . equitable solutions’” (quoting Caroline Farrell, Just Transition:
Lessons from the Environmental Justice Movement, 4 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 55 (2012)
(emphasis in original))).
204. See Uma Outka, Environmental Injustice and the Problem of the Law, 57 ME. L. REV. 209,
236 (2005) [hereinafter Outka, The Problem of the Law] (“Luke Cole argues that the strategic use of
public participation provisions can serve both to protect vulnerable communities from environmental
harms, as in El Pueblo, and also to bring ‘those communities together to realize and exercise their
collective power.’” (quoting Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots
Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENV’T L.J. 687, 689 (1995) [hereinafter
Cole, Models of Environmental Advocacy]); Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 181, at
808 (explaining that “grassroots struggles are a crucial arena of restructuring social relations in
systems of localized environmental decision-making”).
205. See generally Luke W. Cole, The Theory and Reality of Community-Based Environmental
Decisionmaking: The Failure of California’s Tanner Act and Its Implications for Environmental
Justice, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 733 (1999) [hereinafter Cole, Theory and Reality] (noting failures of public
participation provisions intended to improve community involvement).
206. See Cole, Models of Environmental Advocacy, supra note 204, at 703.
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experience, expertise, and opportunities to organize that can help advance
movements for justice beyond a specific project.207 In this sense, public
participation provisions can play an important role in building broader
community capacity during the early stages of decarbonization.
2.

Environmental Justice and NEPA’s Structural Limits

NEPA took on an early and central role in federal attempts to advance
environmental justice.208 In 1994, well after NEPA had settled into its
current structure, President Clinton issued an executive order directing
federal agencies to incorporate issues of environmental justice into their
decision-making procedures under NEPA.209 Looking to NEPA made
sense, as commitments to justice are consistent with NEPA’s statutory
policy.210 NEPA’s process could also generate information that would
help regulators better understand disparate impacts of their decisions and
better disseminate information regarding a decision to affected
communities.211 President Clinton expressly identified NEPA’s public
participation requirements and EPA’s section 309 oversight as important
tools for advancing justice and holding agencies accountable to that
demand.212
Agencies generally set out to incorporate these goals through
discretionary guidance documents, rather than legally-binding

207. See id. at 705–06.
208. NEPA’s disappointing history with the pursuit of justice has been extensively documented
elsewhere. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENV’T
L. REV. 149, 153–57 (2013) [hereinafter Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Environmental Law]
(reviewing briefly NEPA’s history as a tool for advancing environmental justice to draw out two
central reforms proposed by environmental justice advocates). See generally Outka, NEPA and
Environmental Justice, supra note 44 (describing NEPA’s limitations and “structural gaps” as a tool
for advancing environmental justice).
209. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1994).
210. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 7 (1997) [hereinafter CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE],
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-02/documents/ej_guidance_nepa_ceq1297.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XQ3-9DXE] (noting that “attainment of environmental justice is wholly consistent
with the purposes and policies of NEPA”); Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice, supra note 44,
at 605 (“Environmental justice is consistent with—and even implicit in—the stated goals of NEPA,
most notably the goal of assuring ‘for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings.’ Environmental justice provides the practical and conceptual
specificity needed to lend content to this otherwise abstract ideal.” (emphasis in original) (quoting
CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE, supra)).
211. See Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 97, at 289 (noting that NEPA “establishes an
environmental review process that can provide useful information to a community questioning the
wisdom and fairness of a siting decision”).
212. Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 1 PUB. PAPERS 241 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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regulations.213 For example, guidance from the Council on Environmental
Quality encouraged all agencies to meaningfully involve communities
early in the NEPA process, support community participation through
“adaptive” and “innovative” approaches, and extend these commitments
beyond NEPA’s procedural requirements to all agency actions affecting
communities of color and low-income communities.214 EPA similarly
issued a guidance document to incorporate environmental justice into its
section 309 review.215
But these ambitions largely foundered on NEPA’s structural
limitations.216 By opting to work through guidance documents rather than
changes in NEPA’s regulatory structure, efforts to advance issues of
justice through the NEPA process were undermined by the limits of that
process.217 For example, agencies would undermine attempts to better
engage communities by taking public comment too late to have any
influence on the agency’s decision.218 Other good-faith efforts, such as
providing documents in multiple languages, would fail to reach structural
barriers of racial and economic inequality that prevented meaningful
community input, such as a community members’ lack of expertise,
resources, or time.219
These failures within the NEPA process were exacerbated by the limits
213. See Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice, supra note 44, at 605–07 (detailing agency
efforts).
214. See CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 9, 13, 15–17.
215. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE IN CLEAN AIR ACT 309 REVIEWS (1999), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201408/documents/enviro_justice_309review.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY8Y-AWHC].
216. Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice, supra note 44, at 608 (noting how “structural gaps
within the statutory and regulatory framework” hindered NEPA’s ability to serve environmental
justice).
217. Cf. CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 21 (“The guidance
interprets NEPA as implemented through the CEQ regulations in light of Executive Order 12898. It
does not create any rights, benefits, or trust obligations, either substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any person, or entity in any court against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any other
person.”).
218. See Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice, supra note 44, at 610 (noting that “there is only
a negligible chance that an agency will choose the no action alternative at this stage” where the public
is involved); see also Letter from Richard Moore, Chair, Nat’l Env’t Just. Advisory Council, to
Andrew Wheeler, Administrator, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency (Aug. 14, 2019) [hereinafter NEJAC
Letter],
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-10/documents/nejac_letter_nepa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LKA8-TDRL] (“[M]ost disconcerting is that while NEPA intends for an
examination of reasonable alternatives, analysts often go into their work with a predetermined
preferred alternative.”).
219. See, e.g., Foster, Devolved Collaboration, supra note 177, at 463 (criticizing one agency
approach as, “[l]ike its predecessor approaches, . . . indifferent to (or innocent about) the social,
structural, and institutional conditions necessary to realize its own promises, including its aspiration
of more equitable decisions”).
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of NEPA’s oversight structure. NEPA’s “essentially procedural” nature
made agency commitments to environmental justice largely
unenforceable by communities affected by the agency’s decision.220 And
the lack of any credible means of executive oversight meant there was no
coordinated way to shift agency decision-making away from abstract
issues of environmental planning towards contextualized and
individualized understanding of racial and economic inequality within a
community.221 Without that kind of centralized change in how federal
agencies approached environmental decision-making, pursuing
environmental justice through NEPA was self-limiting. As such, the
pursuit of justice has been relegated to “a small and underemphasized part
of the NEPA process.”222
Recognizing these limitations, environmental justice scholars and
advocates broadly identified two proposals for reforming NEPA.223 The
first is to affirmatively require that agencies address structural barriers to
meaningful community participation by engaging communities of color
and low-income communities and, where necessary, providing these
communities with expertise and resources.224 The second line of reform is
220. See Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice, supra note 44, at 605 (noting that NEPA’s
“essentially procedural” nature “is the fundamental limitation of NEPA as a tool for environmental
justice and other forms of environmental protection”); Outka, The Problem of the Law, supra note
204, at 238 (explaining that courts “do not enforce [the Executive Order’s] mandates” and discussing
general judicial failure to require environmental justice analyses).
221. See Gauna, Three Frameworks, supra note 86, at 49–51; see also Foster, Devolved
Collaboration, supra note 177, at 467.
222. NEJAC Letter, supra note 218; see also Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Environmental
Law, supra note 208, at 155 (noting that environmental justice reforms “have, no doubt, exposed
distributional impacts in ways that have empowered disadvantaged communities and improved
outcomes, but they have not placed distributional outcomes or participatory control at the center of
environmental decision-making”).
223. Additional reforms to address other elements of NEPA, such as its timing and scope, have
been proposed. See, e.g., Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice, supra note 44, at 610–18
(surveying reforms).
224. See, e.g., Foster, Devolved Collaboration, supra note 177, at 463 (warning that participatory
reforms can “add renewed legitimacy to racial and class distributional inequities, further entrenching
them in the landscape of environmental decisions” without attention to the “social, structural, and
institutional conditions necessary to realize its own promises . . . particularly the existence of social
capital within communities seeking to form collaborative structures”); Outka, Justice in the
Renewable Energy Transition, supra note 193, at 108 (noting that, in land use permitting contexts,
the “burden on project opponents to hire an attorney and produce expert testimony in support of
objections to a permit application or approval is often insurmountable for environmental justice
advocates”); see also Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental
Decisions: Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through Partnership with Experts and Agents,
27 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 151, 223–24 (2010) (“If we believe in the underlying purpose of public
participation, we must equip citizens with the agents and experts they need to make their participation
authentic and effective.”); Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental
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to build expertise on issues of racial and economic justice among
environmental agencies.225 Scholars argue that voluntary efforts to
address environmental justice, even those in good faith, failed in part
because of a tension between agencies’ institutional competence and the
demands of racial and economic justice.226 Resolving this tension requires
more than “fixing” the regulatory process; it requires centering
environmental regulation around a new set of normative values regarding
race and inequality.227 Recent years have seen continued advocacy on
these fronts, but with frustratingly little success.228
These proposals resonate with calls to revitalize NEPA’s executiveoversight structure. The reforms identified by environmental justice
advocates reflect a lack of meaningful accountability within NEPA’s
structure—a commitment to public engagement without the structural
tools or oversight features to effectively accomplish that commitment.
This character stems in large part from the failure of NEPA’s executiveoversight function and subsequent misfit between NEPA’s intended
structure and ultimate purposes, including its participatory function.229
This misfit is at the root of NEPA’s procedural character, which has in
turn stymied NEPA’s ability to advance environmental justice. Reforms
targeted at harmonizing NEPA’s structure with its participatory function
Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 659, 688 (2005) (noting that affected communities “may possess
direct experiential knowledge about potential flaws in a project” yet are unable to effectively provide
that input in agency processes without expertise and resources); Gerrard, Victims of NIMBY, supra
note 98, at 522 (“Minority communities should be given the technical and legal resources they need
to participate in crucial siting decisions.”).
225. See, e.g., Foster, Devolved Collaboration, supra note 177, at 497–98 (arguing for an adoption
of a core set of normative goals); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-77,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EPA NEEDS TO TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO HELP ENSURE EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION 31 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585654.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHM2FS77] (arguing that, despite years of efforts to implement an environmental justice plan within the
agency, the “EPA cannot assure itself, its stakeholders, and the public that it has established a
framework to effectively guide and assess its efforts to integrate environmental justice into the fabric
of the agency”).
226. Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism: Finding Environmental Justice’s
Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 27–29 (2002).
227. Id. at 26–27 (“The question of how to address environmental protection and discrimination
concerns is not simply a legal or technical regulatory question. The legal and regulatory approaches
embodied within environmental and civil rights law and policy are premised not only on technical
assessments of the problems that are to be solved but also on fundamental value judgments. To the
extent that conflicting technical regulatory and legal doctrinal approaches evince fundamental value
conflicts, we are forced to make some difficult choices between them. These tensions emphasize that
the demands for ‘environmental justice’ implicate issues much more far-reaching than simply ‘fixing’
environmental regulations.”).
228. See Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift, supra note 87, at 820 (noting failed attempts at
reform as part of the Obama-era Clean Power Plan).
229. See supra section II.A.

Sassman (Do Not Delete)

2021]

12/14/2021 10:05 PM

EMPOWERMENT IN DECARBONIZATION

1553

therefore offer a shared path towards both empowering communities and
revitalizing NEPA.
III. HARMONIZING NEPA TO EMPOWER COMMUNITIES
IN DECARBONIZATION
This Part offers proposals for revitalizing NEPA as a tool for
community empowerment in decarbonization. Section III.A articulates
the proposals for regulatory changes that would leverage NEPA’s process
to empower communities in decarbonization and strengthen executive
oversight. These proposals draw on prior scholarship, aligning wellrecognized reforms in a novel way to achieve a timely goal. Section III.B
offers three arguments in support of these proposals. This section
articulates how the proposals align with the goals of empowering
communities and centering justice in environmental policy. It also
articulates how these proposals would support decarbonization by
incorporating best practices drawn from empirical research on community
engagement in renewable energy development.230
A.

Proposals

This section offers two general proposals. Section III.A.1 articulates
reforms intended to focus NEPA’s process on empowering communities
through four regulatory changes. This first part discusses the central
proposal that regulations include a qualitative requirement that agencies
meaningfully engage with communities affected by the proposed action,
and highlights several additional regulatory changes intended to support
this requirement. Section III.A.2 then details several reforms intended to
strengthen NEPA’s executive oversight structure as a credible means of
enforcing the prior section’s commitments, including the requirement for
meaningful community engagement.

230. These proposals assume good-faith effort to reform NEPA in two senses. For example, they
assume that decarbonization reforms will not simply exempt major decarbonization initiatives, such
as renewable energy infrastructure, from NEPA and other environmental laws. This assumption is in
line with general proposals of decarbonization advocates. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying
text. If it turns out the other way, there is simply no need to discuss NEPA reform. In addition, it
assumes that other reforms will occur, such as some streamlining reforms and consideration of
cumulative and indirect impacts. Such reforms are extensively documented, and indeed the Biden
CEQ has already proposed returning consideration of cumulative and indirect impacts to the NEPA
process. See National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions, 86 Fed. Reg.
55,757, 55,766–67 (proposed Oct. 7, 2021) (describing proposed changes to regulations regarding
indirect and cumulative impacts). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that this Article does not
address all reforms with a potential impact on justice, but rather seeks to contribute specific proposals
with transformative implications.
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Require Meaningful Community Engagement

The goal of proposals in this section is to support the transformative
potential of decarbonization by leveraging NEPA’s process to empower
communities. To achieve this goal, this section offers four regulatory
reforms.
To start, NEPA’s regulations should be reformed to include an express,
qualitative requirement that agencies meaningfully engage with
communities affected by the project, including low-income communities
and communities of color. Currently, NEPA regulations require that
agencies solicit and consider public comments.231 While guidance
documents and agency policies have encouraged more meaningful
community engagement, these encouragements are discretionary and
unenforceable.232 This proposal would address this gap by adding a
qualitative requirement that obligates agencies to meaningfully engage
with affected communities.
This qualitative requirement reflects the dynamic but essential role of
community input. As Professor Foster has explained, “meaningful”
engagement requires some level of community influence over the
direction and outcomes of a decision-making process.233 Meeting this
qualitative standard would necessarily look different in different contexts.
The goal is to put the burden on the relevant agency to create an
egalitarian, deliberative framework that incorporates affected
communities into a process designed to encourage their influence over a
proposed action.234
A few contrasts can help illustrate the difference between meaningful
community engagement and other approaches. Currently, federal
regulations require that agencies solicit and accept public comments
during the NEPA process.235 The agency generally has to consider these
comments, but it need not follow them.236 As noted above, many agencies
have been criticized for taking public comments too late in the process to
substantially influence the outcome.237 Call this “public input”—
231. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(2)(v) (2020).
232. See Outka, The Problem of the Law, supra note 204, at 238–39.
233. See Foster, Devolved Collaboration, supra note 177, at 471 (“A better approach would be one
that provides ‘meaningful’ public participation, a requirement defined to mean a deliberative process
whereby stakeholders engage in an egalitarian discourse about what outcome best serves the common
good of the affected community.”).
234. Id.
235. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(2)(v) (2020).
236. Id. § 1503.4 (explaining that agencies shall consider substantive comments but need not
respond to all of them or take action in response).
237. See NEJAC Letter, supra note 218.
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providing an opportunity for public comment without any guarantee of
influence.238 Alternatively, agencies may engage affected communities in
addition to the public comment process. An agency might hold public
hearings or information sessions in the affected community, actively reach
out to community leaders or groups, make documents available in the
community’s language, or take other steps not expressly required by
regulations.239 These efforts promote community participation, but they
typically don’t address barriers stemming from systemic
disempowerment.240 Call this “community engagement”—taking active
steps to facilitate community participation, but failing to match these with
interventions targeted at addressing systemic barriers to participation.241
Building on the work of Professor Foster and others, requiring
“meaningful community engagement” as proposed by this Article
envisions the agency taking an active role in structuring the participatory
process to ensure some community influence over the outcome.242
Currently, regulations require public input.243 Agencies are encouraged
through guidance documents or other policies to pursue community
engagement, but there is no obligation to do so.244 The proposal here is
reform NEPA’s regulations to require community engagement and
more—to match an active approach to community involvement with
additional requirements targeted at addressing the barriers to
communities’ influence over the outcome of the process.
Specifically, this Article proposes three additional reforms. First, the
regulations should ensure that this overall requirement for meaningful
community engagement applies to early stages of the NEPA process, such
as environmental assessments, and any other relevant NEPA actions
238. Agencies and other groups have created “spectra” of public participation to help illustrate
differences between approaches to public participation. What I call “public input” in the text would
be understood as “informing” and “consulting” on these tools. See FACILITATING POWER, THE
SPECTRUM OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT TO OWNERSHIP 2, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.n
et/facilitatingpower/pages/53/attachments/original/1596746165/CE2O_SPECTRUM_2020.pdf?159
6746165 [https://perma.cc/9NS5-RFZ8]; COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, COLLABORATION IN NEPA:
A HANDBOOK FOR NEPA PRACTITIONERS 11 (2007) [hereinafter CEQ, COLLABORATION IN NEPA],
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/CEQ_Collaboration_in_NEPA_10-2007.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9V85-EJ6J].
239. See CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 10–13 (describing these
methods).
240. See supra section II.A.
241. On the spectra referenced above, this would be understood as “involving” communities.
FACILITATING POWER, supra note 238, at 3; CEQ, COLLABORATION IN NEPA, supra note 238, at 11.
242. This would be understood as “collaborating” or “deferring to” on the spectra. FACILITATING
POWER, supra note 238, at 3; CEQ, COLLABORATION IN NEPA, supra note 238, at 11.
243. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503 (2020) (requiring public comment).
244. See CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 10–13.
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developed as part of decarbonization reforms. An important gap in reform
proposals is that they encourage alternative methods for complying with
NEPA’s procedural requirements without extending public participation
requirements to those alternative methods. For example, many
decarbonization advocates propose greater reliance on environmental
assessments in renewable energy projects.245 While the NEPA process is
generally focused on the environmental impact statement, regulations also
allow agencies to rely on shorter documents called “environmental
assessments” to satisfy NEPA’s procedural requirements in particular
contexts.246 Among other differences, regulations do not require the same
public participation process for environmental assessments that are
required for environmental impact statements.247 Decarbonization
advocates argue for greater use of these shorter documents to speed up the
NEPA process for renewable energy projects, but do not match those
proposals with extensions of the public participation requirements.248
Reforms intended to advance decarbonization through increased use of
environmental assessments or other alternative methods should therefore
also extend participation requirements.249
Second, the regulations should include requirements to specifically
elevate the voices of communities of color and low-income communities
in the engagement process. Acknowledging and confronting the legacies
of disempowerment carried by these communities is a prerequisite to a
regulatory system that empowers their voices. As such, reforms should
include at least two specific requirements. To start, regulations should
require that agencies identify and solicit the participation of communities
of color and low-income communities potentially affected by the decision,
with particular sensitivity to how best to engage with communities and
245. See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 67, at 10,605 (proposing that “[a]nother way to reduce the
number of EIS is to allow more projects to obtain approvals with a lower degree of environmental
review,” such as environmental assessments).
246. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5 (2020).
247. Id. § 1501.5(e) (noting that agencies need only involve the public “to the extent practicable”).
248. See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 67, at 10605 (proposing greater use of environmental
assessments and mitigated FONSIs, but not extensions to public participation in the process).
Nevertheless, a wide range of commenters have encouraged extending public involvement to these
methods, including the environmental assessment. See Nicholas C. Yost, CEQ’s “Forty Questions:”
The Key to Understanding NEPA, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Spring 2009, at 8, 10 (lead author of 1978
regulations); see also Ron Deverman, P.E. Hudson, Karen Johnson, Ronald E. Lamb, Daniel R.
Mandelker, Stephen Pyle & Dr. Robert Senner, Environmental Assessments: Guidance on Best
Practice Principles, 45 ENV’T L. REP. 10142, 10156 (2015) (noting broad support for public
participation in the development of mitigated FONSIs).
249. And specifically, regulations should ensure community engagement in the development of
any other relevant NEPA actions developed in the reforms, such as supplemental NEPA documents,
monitoring, or mitigation updates.
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support their influence over the process and outcomes. While agency
guidance encourages this kind active approach to community
engagement, reframing it as a necessary feature of NEPA’s process would
both empower communities and limit NEPA’s role in replicating systemic
inequalities through processes that appear fair but functionally exclude
these communities. Regulations should also require that agencies provide
affected communities with the access, resources, and expertise necessary
to meaningfully contribute to the decision-making process.250 As
discussed in the next paragraph, there are many ways to do so, and it is
essential that agencies maintain flexibility in meeting this requirement
that allows communities to lead. Communities are in the best position to
determine what they need to make their participation meaningful.251
Third, regulations should require that agencies take a contextualized,
case-by-case approach to community engagement. Methods of
community engagement is one place where flexibility and contextsensitivity are more important than predictability and specificity.252 While
this increases a level of uncertainty in what the process looks like, it
enables a greater sensitivity to the social and ecological contexts of a
particular decision. There are a wide range of proposed models for
agencies to achieve this outcome—such as community advisory groups
with access to agency expertise and funding—and communities should be
able to leverage multiple models depending on their needs and context.253
However, clear requirements that agencies engage and support the input
of affected communities would empower communities rather than simply
involve them.
EPA and the Council on Environmental Quality’s oversight play an
essential supporting role for these changes. To start, CEQ has substantial
influence over agency regulations. In concert with CEQ, the White House
can order agencies to reform their own agency-specific regulations to
250. See supra note 218.
251. Baker, supra note 80, at 43–44 (noting that communities “particularly the most vulnerable,
are best positioned to create frameworks that unburden them”).
252. See Cole, Theory and Reality, supra note 205, at 755 (noting downsides to informal
participation procedures).
253. See, e.g., Tai, supra note 224, at 709–14 (reviewing proposals to empower communities with
teaching and other support); James T.B. Tripp & Nathan G. Alley, Streamlining NEPA’s
Environmental Review Process: Suggestions for Agency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 74, 92 (2003)
(discussing “complex, large-scale planning initiatives which have been incorporating similar kinds of
‘stakeholder committees’ at early stages of project planning and environmental review, involving
stakeholders in the NEPA scoping and EIS review processes well before a specific proposed or
preferred plan of action is selected” (footnote omitted)); Cole, The Theory and Reality, supra note
205, at 735 (reviewing models of the participation of affected communities using examples from
California); Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit, supra note 197, at 57 (discussing advisory
councils, notice and comment, informal public participation, and agency self-reflection models).
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meet the requirements of NEPA’s implementing regulations. Moreover,
EPA and CEQ oversight extends to both regulatory review and individual
actions, and this oversight can evaluate agency actions under criteria
beyond the agency’s own regulations. This is the start to answering
difficult questions with qualitative proposals like those articulated above.
What’s to prevent an agency from defining “meaningful community
engagement” to mean taking public comments? How will a court
adjudicate a dispute of whether a community’s input was “meaningful,”
or whether the agency provided sufficient resources to support a
community’s input? This Article’s answer, at least partially, is in a
stronger, more public executive oversight structure.
2.

Strengthen Executive Oversight

As discussed in Part II, NEPA’s executive oversight structure has been
underutilized and hindered by poor regulatory design. The central goal of
this proposal is to reform this executive oversight structure and leverage
it as the primary enforcement mechanism for the proposals in the prior
paragraph. Moreover, and consistent with NEPA’s structure, a more
robust executive oversight structure would provide a credible tool for
centering justice across federal environmental policy. To accomplish
these goals, I propose three reforms.
First, the regulations should extend EPA and CEQ review to include
the agency’s final decision.254 EPA’s section 309 review has historically
been limited to commenting on the agency’s NEPA process rather than
the agency’s ultimate decision.255 This commenting process can have
important effects when fully utilized and elevated to CEQ. 256 But it is
nevertheless limited in its ability to influence the agency’s ultimate
decision. Commenters have therefore proposed reforming NEPA’s
regulations to permit EPA referrals of agency decisions, giving EPA
greater ability to review the substance of the outcome rather than the
process itself.257 EPA should retain its ability to comment and consult with
agencies during the NEPA process. But extending review would provide,
for example, necessary perspective to determine whether communities
were able to influence the outcome of the process.
This change would help shift EPA and CEQ’s role from a “lobbyist”

254. See Andreen, supra note 131, at 259.
255. Id. at 257 (“Nevertheless, CEQ has in effect prohibited the filing of such referrals.”).
256. See id. at 238–41 (discussing some positive examples of referral outcomes).
257. See id. at 258 (“The implementation of this comprehensive structural reform still awaits
administrative action. CEQ thus should amend its NEPA regulations to require agencies to provide
EPA with copies of all RODs.”).
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within other agencies to a more effective regulatory model.258 Eric Biber
reviewed different models within the federal bureaucracy for how best to
get an agency to incorporate new values into their mission.259 NEPA is an
example of this problem—it sought to get agencies that historically did
not value environmental sustainability to do so. Its current method for
accomplishing this goal is for EPA to “lobby” other agencies through
comments during the NEPA process for better consideration of
environmental values.260 Biber contrasted this approach with the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA’s) “effective” veto over
agency regulations that did not meet certain economic standards.261
Importantly, OIRA’s power also stemmed from informal executive
branch oversight pressure—as does EPA and CEQ’s power under NEPA.
But OIRA’s informal veto power proved more effective in promoting
OIRA’s values across other agencies.262 The idea here is to shift EPA and
CEQ’s oversight to a model similar to OIRA’s by shifting review to an
agency’s decision, rather than seeking to only influence the agency’s
process.
Second, regulations should prohibit agencies from moving forward
until EPA and CEQ’s review of the agency action is complete.263 In
addition to simply allowing EPA and CEQ to review the final decision,
this change would amplify EPA and CEQ’s “veto” power.264
Third, the regulations should ensure that both EPA and CEQ’s review
of the agency’s final action are public. While EPA’s review of the
agency’s NEPA process is made public, there is no requirement to create
a record or otherwise document the outcome of any referral to CEQ.265
Making public both EPA’s review of a final agency decision as well as
258. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal
Agencies, 33 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 43 (2009).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 47–51.
261. Id. at 47–49.
262. Id. at 47–51.
263. Andreen, supra note 131, at 258 (“During this review period, agencies should be prohibited
from taking any action, such as licensing or construction activities which would compromise an
agency’s ability to alter its decision.”).
264. This change would also complement a recent shift in OIRA’s regulatory focus to issues of
racial justice. See Exec. Order No. 13,985, Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved
Communities Through the Federal Government, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021).
265. CEQ has made the results of referrals public in the past. See Council on Env’t Quality, Dep’t
of the Army, Dep’t of the Interior, Resolution of the December 6, 2016, Department of Interior
Referral to the Council on Environmental Quality of the Environmental Impact Statement for the
Army Corp of Engineers’ St. Johns New Madrid Floodway Project (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/nepa-practice/2.19.17-Resolution-letter-on-New-Madrid-project.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2Y6-H73L].
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documentation of the CEQ referral process would facilitate both political
and public accountability.266 As others have noted, publicity generated
from the CEQ referral process has occasionally prompted action from
Congress.267 Moreover, creating a more complete record of EPA or CEQ’s
dissatisfaction with agency final decisions could support citizen lawsuits,
which in turn can act as an indirect form of enforcement.268 Nevertheless,
stronger EPA and CEQ oversight would be preferable to relying on citizen
enforcement in most cases, both as a means of reducing judicial reliance
and improving initial agency decisions.269
Two final observations are helpful here. First, the process envisioned
by these reforms is compatible with more substantive requirements
directed at community empowerment and advancing justice, such as an
express community veto over projects proposed in communities of color
or low-income communities.270 While not necessary achieve these
proposals’ goals, the regulatory structure envisioned here could
accommodate these changes, whether as part of NEPA’s regulations or in
other policies intended to advance justice in decarbonization. Second, a
revived executive oversight structure depends on investments in staff and
personnel.271 A long-standing limit to EPA and CEQ’s review authority
has been limited budgets and limited personnel.272 Expanding both will be
necessary to invest in an effective oversight structure, and this need
resonates with broader calls by decarbonization advocates to increase

266. See Jamison E. Colburn, Administering the National Environmental Policy Act, 45 ENV’T L.
REP. 10287, 10302 (2015) (noting that “NEPA perhaps assumes the president will” implement
NEPA’s policy “by jawboning and other informal means” hidden from public view).
267. Andreen, supra note 131, at 258 (“Moreover, the publicity generated by formal referrals may,
on occasion, prompt direct congressional intervention.”).
268. Biber, supra note 258, at 52–57 (describing the indirect agency regulation model, where a
third parties enforce substantive obligations through, for example, citizen suits).
269. See Michael C. Blumm & Stephen R. Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role of
Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 277, 309 (1990) (noting that a
greater role for EPA and CEQ in enforcing NEPA would “reduce reliance on court injunctions to
implement the nation’s environmental policy”).
270. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Fromherz, From Consultation to Consent: Community Approval as a
Prerequisite to Environmentally Significant Projects, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 109 (2013) (proposing a
kind of community veto for environmentally significant projects).
271. Andreen, supra note 131, at 259 (“None of these reforms, however, will succeed unless CEQ
and EPA request and receive additional funding and staff to initiate this expanded form of
environmental oversight.”); Blumm, supra note 269, at 286–87 (“[T]he effectiveness of CEQ’s
oversight role will still be constricted by its small size”); see also Holly Doremus, Through Another’s
Eyes: Getting the Benefit of Outside Perspectives in Environmental Review, 38 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L.
REV. 247, 272 (2011) (discussing the importance of agency capacity and expertise in effective
oversight).
272. See Andreen, supra note 131, at 259.
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agency capacity to implement NEPA.273
B.

Benefits

This section offers three lines of argument in support of these
proposals. First, the proposals will empower communities of color and
low-income communities in decarbonization both during the NEPA
process and more broadly by building capacity in communities. Second,
the proposals support rapid decarbonization by enabling community
engagement that is likely to avoid opposition to projects and generate
better project outcomes. Finally, harmonizing NEPA’s publicparticipation and executive-oversight structures breathes new life into
NEPA’s original purpose of unifying federal administrative actions
regarding the environment towards a common goal. By leveraging NEPA
to center justice in federal policy, the proposals offer a credible tool for
advancing the Biden Administration’s “whole-of-government”
commitment to justice in decarbonization.274
1.

Empowering Communities

Together, these proposals provide a regulatory framework for
meaningfully engaging communities in federal decision-making during
decarbonization and supporting that engagement with an executive
oversight function. While these proposals are intended to improve specific
project outcomes, they also serve three broader goals in empowering
communities of color and low-income communities.
First, the proposals leverage NEPA to build capacity in communities
of color and low-income communities. Specifically, the proposals place
the burden on agencies to provide technical or other resources necessary
for these communities’ meaningful involvement in the decision-making
process. These principles carry deep importance in the transition to a clean
energy economy. A central task of ensuring justice and equity in the
transition is ensuring that communities are not simply involved in
decarbonization, but have the capacity and expertise to guide major
decisions affecting their community. These targeted reforms can leverage
NEPA to help build this capacity in a meaningful, albeit incremental, way.
Second, these proposals recognize the limits of public participation
procedures in achieving justice and seek to empower communities of
color and low-income communities for when the process fails them. The
273. Gerrard, supra note 67, at 10604–05 (arguing for an increase to staffing at agencies to handle
NEPA responsibilities).
274. See Fact Sheet on Biden Climate Plan, supra note 60 (using the phrase “whole-ofgovernment” approach).
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proposals do so in two senses. To start, the proposals articulate the
agency’s obligations to communities of color and low-income
communities. In addition to improving agency outcomes in the process,
the proposals leverage agency procedures to help distinguish these
communities’ claims from possible framing as NIMBY opposition. This
both increases the potential that agencies will be responsive to these
communities’ concerns in the process, and also helps guard against
attempts to lump community claims together as NIMBYism in later
executive or judicial review.275 Moreover, making EPA and CEQ’s review
of agency decisions public can further leverage any issues raised by those
agencies in later judicial review.
Finally, these proposals leverage NEPA’s influence as the primary
model for public participation in environmental decision-making.
Historically, NEPA has served as a model for similar state and
international laws.276 Reforms to NEPA’s process, particularly in public
participation, can have important influence beyond NEPA.277 As an early
step in legal reforms to enable decarbonization, NEPA can serve as a
model for better incorporating communities in decision-making methods
at various levels of government.
2.

Supporting Rapid Decarbonization

The proposals also support rapid decarbonization by leveraging
methods likely to reduce opposition to renewable energy development and
result in better projects. Arguing in favor of more and more meaningful
community engagement as a way to speed up the environmental review
process may be counterintuitive. More requirements and more
opportunities for public involvement, the argument might go, creates
more opportunities for delay and conflict. But as this section will explain,
empirical research on public opposition to renewable energy projects
suggests the opposite: that early and meaningful community involvement
is key to resolving opposition to projects.
While every project is different and complex, community opposition to
275. See Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 97, at 286 (“Information gleaned through
environmental laws and environmental review procedures can assist in generating a ‘prima facie case’
that the site is not ‘qualified’ and can assist a community’s challenge of the justifications offered by
decisionmakers. The identification of irrationalities or inconsistencies in the siting process may
strengthen the inference that the decision was motivated by a disregard for a community, and increase
the evidence supporting the claim that a community’s opposition goes beyond NIMBY to include a
demand for fairness.”).
276. See Houck, supra note 33, at 173.
277. See Jayni Foley Hein & Natalie Jacewicz, Implementing NEPA in the Age of Climate Change,
10 MICH. J. ENV’T. L. & ADMIN. L. 1, 8 (2020) (noting how NEPA reforms can serve as inspiration
for innovations at the state level).
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renewable energy projects frequently shares two features: a lack of trust
in developers, regulators, or the process, and a sense that the local
community is not benefitting from the project.278 Early and meaningful
involvement of communities in the siting and planning process can
address both issues.
First, studies suggest that early and meaningful involvement of
communities can reduce opposition by building trust between project
developers, regulators, and the community. Community trust in regulators
appears to be a central element in effective projects, and communities
value a fair process regardless of project outcomes.279 Again, the ability
of communities to influence the ultimate outcome is central to the fairness
of the process.280 When a community perceives that the project developer
or regulator comes to the community having already made the central
decisions regarding the project, an early breakdown of trust can sour the
process and result in opposition.281 In this sense, a poorly designed process
can be worse than no process at all. This puts NEPA’s process in
important context, as it is frequently criticized as involving communities
only after the major decisions regarding the project have been made.282
By requiring early and meaningful involvement of communities, the
proposals seek to leverage NEPA’s process to build trust rather than the
opposite.
Second, meaningful community engagement can reduce opposition by
better producing benefits for a community. One of the principal sources
of opposition to renewable energy projects is a perceived unfairness that
the projects’ main benefits are being enjoyed beyond the local
community.283 Several decades of research suggest that socioeconomic
impacts of a project are “very important” to motivating community
278. Rand & Hoen, supra note 94, at 20 (noting the importance of benefits and trust in community
acceptance of wind projects).
279. Id. (“A planning process that is perceived as ‘fair’ can lead to greater toleration of the outcome,
even if it does not fully satisfy all stakeholders.”).
280. See, e.g., Lu Liu, Thijs Bouman, Goda Perlaviciute & Linda Steg, Public Participation in
Decision Making, Perceived Procedural Fairness and Public Acceptability of Renewable Energy
Projects, 1 ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE 100013, 100014 (2020) (conducting three studies showing
“that project acceptability is higher when people perceive the decision-making process as fairer,” and
that “one way to enhance perceived procedural fairness is to involve people in decision making, and
particularly by enabling people to influence decisions over major aspects of the project”).
281. See Rand & Hoen, supra note 94, at 16–17 (noting how excluding affected communities from
the development process can generate feelings of injustice and distrust).
282. See, e.g., NEJAC Letter, supra note 218 (noting that, in NEPA assessments, “analysts often
go into their work with a predetermined preferred alternative”).
283. Rand & Hoen, supra note 94, at 20 (“In general, those living near wind facilities want benefits
that stay in the local community, and they feel a sense of injustice about bearing the burden of costs
when consumption of and profits related to the power are enjoyed elsewhere.”).
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opposition, and these issues are exacerbated when communities feel
economically or politically disconnected from the project.284 As such,
community benefit agreements or other direct benefits to local
communities are becoming increasingly common in siting renewable
energy projects.285 Interested parties can develop these arrangements
through the environmental permitting process, including the NEPA
process.286 Incorporating communities more fully in the planning process
can direct developers to provide clear and more appropriate benefits for a
community.287
Lessons from the siting and development of offshore wind in the United
States have supported these insights.288 Successful examples share two
elements of meaningful community engagement.289 First, the project
design process showed that all participants, including experts and local
stakeholders, learned from each other while reconciling technical
expertise with community values.290 Second, outcomes included clear
benefits for the community that the community helped develop.291 The
proposals offered here create a regulatory structure for achieving these
outcomes for all communities, including communities of color and lowincome communities, through NEPA’s process.
The proposals’ express requirements to empower and elevate
communities of color and low-income communities also help ensure that
these communities benefit from the transition. Studies show that the
ultimate effectiveness of benefits agreements associated with renewable
energy developments is directly related to the power dynamic between the

284. Id. at 11, 20.
285. See Sandy Kerr, Kate Johnson & Stephanie Weir, Understanding Community Benefit
Payments from Renewable Energy Development, 105 ENERGY POL’Y 202, 202 (2017) (“It is
increasingly common for renewable energy projects to incorporate financial packages that make
payments directly, or in kind, to local communities.”).
286. See, e.g., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, EVALUATING
BENEFITS OF OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY PROJECTS IN NEPA 3–39 (2017),
https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/environmental-stewardship/Environmental-Studies/
Renewable-Energy/Final-Version-Offshore-Benefits-White-Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YY4FN8UA] (describing the role of community benefits in evaluating an offshore wind project’s impacts
under NEPA).
287. See Sarah C. Klain, Terre Satterfield, Suzanne MacDonald, Nicholas Battista & Kai M.A.
Chan, Will Communities ‘Open-Up’ to Offshore Wind? Lessons Learned from New England Islands
in the United States, 34 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 13, 22 (2017) (noting the fairness, clarity, and
certainty values of developing benefits with community members).
288. Id. at 16–17.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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developer and communities.292 Leveraging federal authority to empower
communities in this process would help correct imbalanced dynamics and
would advance commitments that these communities’ benefit from in the
transition. As Professor Alice Kaswan has noted, projects generated with
the leadership of communities intended to benefit from the project are
more likely to meet their actual needs, rather than their perceived needs,
and less likely to do unintended harm to those communities.293 Professor
Baker makes a similar point, noting that “stakeholders, particularly the
most vulnerable, are best positioned to create frameworks that unburden
them.”294
While these studies support the proposals here, it is important not to
overemphasize past experience. The scale of decarbonization will require
development at scale and speeds never before seen, largely under new
social and geographic conditions than prior projects in the United States.
The important takeaway here is that empirical evidence supports more and
more meaningful community involvement, not less, if the sole goal is to
enable rapid deployment of renewable energy. Even streamlined,
federalized methods of siting energy infrastructure still face opposition
from state and local interests.295 This takeaway should align those
skeptical of community engagement’s role in decarbonization with those
that recognize the essential role that communities must play in achieving
the transformative potential of decarbonization.
3.

Centering Justice

In addition to empowering communities and supporting
decarbonization, leveraging NEPA’s structure to empower communities
offers the potential to center justice as a guiding value in environmental
policy. The proposals here offer potential to do so in two senses.
First, the Article’s proposals give EPA and CEQ practical oversight
authority over a wide range of federal actions implicating justice in
decarbonization. A central opportunity in reforming EPA’s section 309
and referral authorities is to transition EPA and CEQ into an oversight
role similar to that of OMB and OIRA. While OIRA’s success leveraged
292. See Kerr, et al., supra note 285, at 209 (concluding that “[p]ower relations are at the heart” of
effective community benefits payments agreements and “that achieving[] optimum benefit payment[]
outcomes requires policy that is adapted to underlying power relations and institutional frameworks”).
293. Kaswan, Greening the Grid, supra note 190, at 1160.
294. Baker, supra note 80, at 43.
295. See Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy
Transportation, 41 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 423, 430 (2017) (describing how state, local, and non-profit
groups can present barriers to even federalized siting procedures such as those for natural gas
pipelines).
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its expertise in economic analysis, here the idea would be for EPA and
CEQ to leverage specific expertise in environmental justice to the many
government actions needed to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This
expertise would serve an important role in policing agency involvement
with communities affected by federal decisions, but would also extend
beyond community engagement to broader policy choices of
decarbonization. EPA and CEQ are therefore uniquely positioned as
agencies with authority over a huge range of federal actions to implement
commitments to community empowerment.
Second, the proposal would place greater emphasis on environmental
justice within EPA and CEQ. As others have emphasized, commitment to
principles of environmental justice within agencies has been hindered by
a perceived disconnect between the models of environmental decisionmaking that emphasize generalized, utilitarian outcomes and approaches
sensitive to inequality that emphasize context-specific and individual
outcomes. Placing greater emphasis on environmental justice and
community empowerment within these agencies’ staff, expertise, mission,
and regular interaction with other agencies can help shift agency culture
towards the contextual and individualized frameworks needed to center
justice within federal environmental policy.
CONCLUSION
NEPA’s structure is uniquely suited to address two early and important
needs of our transition to renewable energy. It offers a method of
leveraging federal public participation requirements to empower
communities, and a credible oversight structure for implementing the
Biden Administration’s “whole-of-government” approach to climate
action that centers justice. Failing to leverage this opportunity risks
undermining the goals of decarbonization, as well as consigning NEPA to
further marginalization. Certainly, there is a risk of asking too much of
NEPA. But its true potential has never been realized. The challenge of
climate change demands the most of our legal and governance structures.
We should approach NEPA’s unique tools with equal optimism and
urgency, leveraging all available tools toward community empowerment
in rapid decarbonization.

